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International adoption is now a familiar phenomenon in the 
United States and elsewhere in the West.  It first became a 
substantial practice following World War II, during which a great 
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number of children were orphaned.1  Its popularity soared in the 
final decades of the twentieth century, as the number of infants 
available for domestic adoption in western countries plummeted.2  
In the past decade, however, the number of international adoptions 
has declined dramatically, despite a steady increase in both the 
number of unparented children3 in poor countries and the number 
of people in developed countries wishing to adopt one or more of 
those children.4  This discrepancy has occurred primarily because 
                                                     
1 See Alice Hearst, Children, International Human Rights, and the Politics of 
Belonging, in WHAT IS RIGHT FOR CHILDREN?: THE COMPETING PARADIGMS OF 
RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 329, 331 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Karen 
Worthington eds., 2009) (arguing that the practice of transnational adoption began 
in the mid-1940s in response to the large number of children “displaced” by the 
Second World War); Peter Selman, Global Trends in Intercountry Adoption: 2001–
2010, ADOPTION ADVOCATE (Nat’l Council for Adoption), Feb. 2012, at 4 
(“Intercountry adoption began to grow in popularity in the aftermath of the 
Second World War.”). 
2 See Hearst, supra note 1, at 331 (stating that twenty to thirty percent of all 
U.S. adoptions are intercountry adoptions); Shani King, Challenging 
Monohumanism: An Argument for Changing the Way We Think About Intercountry 
Adoption, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 413, 423 (2009) (citing Kathleen Ja Sook Bergquist, 
International Asian Adoption: In the Best Interests of the Child?, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. 
REV. 343, 344 (2004)) (suggesting that interest in international adoption grew in 
the 1970s in part because “idealism and activist sentiments of the time resulted in 
demands that the United States atone for its history of racial and gender 
subordination” by adopting a more cosmopolitan attitude and saving children in 
the third world from poverty and oppression); cf. Signe Howell, The Backpackers 
That Come to Stay: New Challenges to Norwegian Transnational Adoptive Families, in 
CROSS-CULTURAL APPROACHES TO ADOPTION 227, 229 (Fiona Bowie ed., 2004) 
(describing a similar phenomenon in Norway). 
3 I use ‘unparented children’ to mean children who should be available for 
adoption because both of their parents have died, abandoned them, or 
permanently relinquished custody and no kin or community members have taken 
over the role of raising them.  For the most part, such children are either in state 
institutional or foster care or are living on the streets.  But not all children living in 
orphanages or on streets fall into this category.  For example, it is common in 
many countries for parents in impoverished regions to place their children in 
orphanages temporarily with the hope that one day they will become capable of 
resuming care for them.  The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has used 
the similar term “children without parental care.”  See Hearst, supra note 1, at 332 
(stating that this phrase was the focus of the UN Committee on the Rights of the 
Child’s September 16, 2005 meeting in Geneva, Switzerland). 
4 See Elizabeth Bartholet, Professor of Law & Faculty Dir. of the Child 
Advocacy Program, Harvard Law Sch., The International Adoption Cliff: Do 
Child Human Rights Matter?, Plenary Speech at the Conference of the Herbert & 
Elinor Nootbar Institute on Law, Religion, and Ethics: Intercountry Adoption: 
Orphan Rescue or Child Trafficking? (Feb. 8–9, 2013) (forthcoming), available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bartholet/pubs.php) (showing a two-
thirds decline in adoptions into the United States from 2004 to 2013); id. (“Since 
2004 the number of orphaned children has only increased, as has the number 
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many countries that have been major “sending countries” have 
imposed new procedural and substantive restrictions on foreign 
adoption or have foreclosed the practice altogether.5 
Procedural obstacles to adoption include a requirement that 
adoption applicants live in-country with the child for a period of 
time, such as six months or a year, which many potential adoptive 
parents cannot afford to do.6  A common substantive restriction is a 
requirement that children be held available for domestic adoption 
for some months or years before the adoption process may begin 
with foreign applicants,7 which all but ensures attachment 
problems for children.8  Less commonly, some states require that 
                                                     
growing up in the institutions that are so destructive to children’s life 
prospects.”). 
5 See Elizabeth Bartholet, International Adoption: The Human Rights Position, 1 
GLOBAL POL’Y 91, 92 (2010) (citing recently-imposed restrictions in Russia and 
China); Meghan Collins Sullivan, For Romania’s Orphans, Adoption is Still a Rarity, 
NPR.ORG (Aug. 19, 2012, 4:39 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/08/19/158924764/ 
for-romanias-orphans-adoption-is-still-ararity (noting that Romania began 
forbidding foreign adoptions a decade ago).  As discussed infra, some of these 
countries’ actions have come at the urging or insistence of international aid 
agencies and NGOs.  See Bartholet, supra note 4 (noting that UNICEF has called 
for reforms in sending countries).  Another contributing factor has been the U.S. 
Department of State’s imposition of a no-tolerance policy for adoption 
improprieties, refusing to cooperate with sending nations that cannot guarantee 
adherence to rules relating to, for example, payments to adoption intermediaries.  
Id. (manuscript at 5) (describing the U.S. State Department standard of “not a 
single ethical violation” applied to international adoption programs). 
6 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of State, Belize, INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION: BUREAU OF 
CONSULAR AFFAIRS (Jan. 2012), http://adoption.state.gov/country_information/ 
country_specific_info.php?country-select=belize (stating that Belize requires 
adoptive parents to live in Belize for 12 months with the child, and that only a 
handful of Americans adopt children from Belize each year); U.S. Dep’t. of State, 
Gambia, INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION: BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS (July 2012), 
http://adoption.state.gov/country_information/country_specific_info.php?coun
try-select=gambia (noting that Gambia requires adoptive parents to be resident in 
the country for a minimum of six months prior to applying for adoption). 
7 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of State, Costa Rica, INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION: BUREAU OF 
CONSULAR AFFAIRS, (Feb. 2011),  http://adoption.state.gov/country_information/ 
country_specific_info.php?country-select=costa_rica (stating that  Costa Rican law 
prohibits foreign adoption of children under age four); U.S. Dep’t of State, Georgia, 
INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION: BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS (Aug. 2011), 
http://adoption.state.gov/country_information/country_specific_info.php?coun
try-select=georgia (reporting that children must be held available for domestic 
adoption for eight months). 
8 Such ‘holding period’ policies are likely to cause many children to have no 
parents for the developmentally crucial first two years of life.  Demand for 
adoption within sending countries is extremely low or non-existent.  Ultimately, 
these holding period requirements cause many children never to be adopted at 
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adopters living abroad be citizens of the child’s country of origin, 
which amounts to de facto prohibition.9 
Sending countries express a variety of justifications for making 
foreign adoption more difficult or impossible, which Part 5 of the 
Article will analyze in greater depth.10  Some of the proffered 
reasons are unassailable, and the real question is whether they are 
weighty enough to justify the restrictions or prohibition.  For 
example, the possibility that adoption applicants are actually sex or 
slave-labor traffickers certainly could justify careful screening 
procedures and, if there were evidence of substantial trafficking 
via the international adoption process in a particular country, even 
a moratorium on out-of-country adoption placements in those 
countries until the problem can be adequately addressed.11  Other 
reasons for creating obstacles to foreign adoption are morally 
questionable, and some are patently illicit.  For example, Russian 
legislation passed in late 2012 prohibiting Americans from 
adopting children in Russia was blatant political retaliation for an 
entirely unrelated action by the American government.12  Other 
                                                     
all, because foreign applicants are deterred.  See Bartholet, supra note 5, at 91 (“[I]t 
is extremely rare for children under the age of one to be placed.”); id. at 93 (stating 
that there is little prospect for domestic adoption in very poor countries and in the 
many Asian countries whose culture includes “a powerful bias for blood-linked 
parenting”); James G. Dwyer, The Child Protection Pretense: States’ Continued 
Consignment of Newborn Babies to Unfit Parents, 93 MINN. L. REV. 407, 415–35 (2008) 
(explaining the developmental importance and time frame of infant attachment); 
see generally Martin T. Stein et al., International Adoption: A 4-Year-Old Child With 
Unusual Behaviors Adopted at 6 Months of Age, 114 PEDIATRICS 1425 (2004) 
(presenting a case study in which various doctors opine on whether a child 
adopted from a Romanian orphanage has Reactive Attachment Disorder). 
9 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of State, Algeria, INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION: BUREAU OF 
CONSULAR AFFAIRS (Nov. 2011), http://adoption.state.gov/country_information/ 
country_specific_info.php?country-select=algeria (stating that Algeria only 
permits Algerian citizens to adopt); U.S. Dep’t of State, Bangladesh, INTERCOUNTRY 
ADOPTION: BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS (Oct. 2013),  http://adoption.state.gov/ 
country_information/country_specific_info.php?country-select=bangladesh 
(explaining that Bangladesh only allows its own citizens to adopt). 
10 The justification offered is, of course, not necessarily the actual reason for 
the state’s actions.  Some countries restrict or foreclose foreign adoption simply 
because international aid organizations like UNICEF pressure them to do so.  See 
infra Section V.  
11 But see infra notes 162–66 and accompanying text (explaining why sex and 
labor-trafficking are actually not significantly connected to inter-country 
adoption). 
12 See David M. Herszenhorn & Erik Eckholm, Putin Signs Bill That Bars U.S. 
Adoptions, Upending Families, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2012, http://www.nytimes. 
com/2012/12/28/world/europe/putin-to-sign-ban-on-us-adoptions-of-russian-
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frequently-expressed motivations are more directly connected to 
adoption but likewise treat unparented children in an instrumental 
fashion—such as protecting a nation’s dignity, resisting neo-
colonialism, or holding on to children as potential future workers.13  
Still other justifications sound child-centered, but reasonable 
persons disagree about the validity, substantiality, and relative 
weight of the concerns.  For example, some commentators express 
concern about children suffering from not growing up in the 
culture of their country of birth, or about parents being induced by 
offers of compensatory payment to relinquish their children for 
adoption.14 
All reasons that nations assert for creating obstacles and all 
specific practices that constitute obstacles should be subject to 
scrutiny and reasoned deliberation.  This should occur within a 
morally appropriate normative framework—that is, with a clear 
and defensible idea of what rights and interests ought to determine 
state policy.  Yet there has been little attention given to the 
foundational task of establishing such a framework.  Debate 
                                                     
children.html (“The bill that includes the adoption ban was drafted in response to 
the Magnitsky Act, a law signed by President Obama this month that will bar 
Russian citizens accused of violating human rights from traveling to the United 
States and from owning real estate or other assets there.”).  Russia’s commissioner 
of children’s rights has defended restrictions on international adoption on the 
grounds that some children adopted by Americans have been abused, killed, or 
returned to Russia.  See David M. Herszenhorn, Russian Says Ban on U.S. Adoption 
Flouts Treaties, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2012, http://www.nytimes. 
com/2012/12/26/world/europe/russian-official-says-adoption-ban-violates-
treaties.html (quoting Russia’s children’s rights commissioner Pavel Ashtakhov) 
(“And we can see that children handed over to the United States are not 
protected.”).  However, as discussed in Part 5, this line of reasoning is irrational; a 
standard of 100% success would condemn any form of care for children, and the 
odds of having basic needs met for Russian orphans are far greater with adoption 
than with remaining in a Russian institution. 
13 See Bartholet, supra note 5, at 92 (“In many ‘sending countries’ national 
pride has led to calls to stop selling, or giving away, ‘our most precious resources’, 
and to claims that the country should ‘take care of our own’.”); David M. 
Herszenhorn, In Russia, Ban on U.S. Adoptions Creates Rancor and Confusion, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 15, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/16/world/europe/in-
russia-ban-on-us-adoptions-creates-rancor-and-confusion.html (quoting a Russian 
politician who accused those opposed to the ban on adoption by Americans of 
wanting to “send our intelligence away to America”). 
14 See, e.g., King, supra note 2, at 414 (emphasizing children’s supposed 
interest in growing up within the culture of their place of birth); David M. Smolin, 
Child Laundering and the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption: The Future and 
Past of Intercountry Adoption, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 441, 444 (2010) (collecting 
evidence of what Smolin terms “child laundering”). 
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concerning state policies on foreign adoption has almost uniformly 
taken as given, and thus operated narrowly within, a flimsy 
normative framework resting on two poorly-drafted international 
conventions relating to children:15  the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (CRC)16 and the Hague Convention on 
Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry 
Adoption (Hague Convention).17  Both conventions contain 
provisions relating specifically to inter-country adoption, but the 
crucial language is opaque, and thus most of the debate concerning 
the provisions focuses on interpretation of that language.18  The 
most contentious debate has concerned what these two 
conventions dictate with respect to prioritizing placement options 
for unparented children as among domestic adoption, domestic 
foster care or guardianship, domestic institutional care, and 
transnational adoption.19 
Because this debate operates almost entirely within the 
framework of these special children’s-rights documents, the 
reasoning tends to be sui generis.  It implicitly supposes that the 
situation of unparented children is unlike that of any other persons 
and does not require support from any broader principles 
                                                     
15 See Hearst, supra note 1, at 335 (noting the importance of the two 
conventions); Richard Carlson, Seeking the Better Interests of Children with a New 
International Law of Adoption, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 733, 737 (2010–11) (“These two 
documents—the CRC and the Hague Convention—frame the debate . . . .”).  In 
fact, the CRC has dominated international debates over child welfare more 
broadly for the past quarter century.  See SARA DILLON, INTERNATIONAL CHILDREN’S 
RIGHTS 3 (2010) (“From the time of its promulgation in 1989, the UNCRC has 
provided the focal point for debate as to how contemporary societies should best 
protect and empower children.”). 
16 See generally Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989) [hereinafter CRC].  
17 Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of 
Intercountry Adoption, May 29, 1993, 1870 U.N.T.S. 167.  The United States is a 
party to the Hague Convention, along with over eighty other nations.  See 
generally U.S. Dep’t of State, Convention Countries, INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION: 
BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS (Aug. 2013), http://adoption.state.gov/hague_ 
convention/countries.php. 
18 See SIGNE HOWELL, THE KINNING OF FOREIGNERS: TRANSNATIONAL ADOPTION 
IN A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 170, 172 (2006) (noting that key provisions in both 
conventions were left “deliberately vague” in order to get past entrenched 
disagreements among groups of nations represented in the negotiations). 
19 See Barbara Yngvesson, National Bodies and the Body of the Child: 
“Completing” Families through International Adoption, in CROSS-CULTURAL 
APPROACHES TO ADOPTION, supra note 2, at 213, 215–17 (describing the debate 
surrounding the final language of the Hague Convention). 
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concerning state treatment of persons in general.  The central thesis 
of this Article is that giving primacy to these child-specific 
conventions is a mistake, arising from what I call “The Special 
Rights Fallacy,” because it facilitates subordination of children’s 
welfare to politics, ideology, and the interests of other persons.20  I 
call for a reorientation of advocacy, analysis, and deliberation 
concerning inter-country adoption, placement priorities for 
unparented children, and movement of children more generally 
out of inhospitable environments and across national boundaries. 
A few other scholars arguing in favor of freer inter-country 
adoption have invoked more general human rights conventions 
and principles—in particular, treaty provisions affirming a right to 
family life.  These authors have thereby challenged the hegemony 
of the child-specific treaties.21  This Article explains why they are 
correct to shift focus away from the CRC and Hague Convention 
and why the most powerful legal strategy for inter-country 
adoption proponents is to put aside those child-specific 
conventions and to appeal instead to general international human 
rights laws.  The Article further analyzes the relative strength of 
various general human rights bases for opposing restrictions on 
foreign adoption, concluding that the right to emigrate—which has 
been entirely ignored in the debate over inter-country adoption—is 
in fact the best vehicle for defending children’s moral right to join 
families in other countries. 
Part 1 below is conceptual; it explains why and how a limited 
focus on group-specific rights provisions, and even passage of such 
provisions in the first instance, can inadvertently make a targeted 
group worse off.  This lesson is applicable not only to children but 
also to other groups such as women, racial or cultural minorities, 
and disabled persons for whom advocates have sought specialized 
rights enactments.  I offer some guidance for determining when, 
                                                     
20 Cf. DILLON, supra note 15, at 3–4 (“[I]t is important to recognize the 
ubiquitousness of adult agendas in all theorizing about children. . . . Because 
children have a symbolic role within the lives of families, cultures and even global 
legal systems, they are very likely to be described in self-serving ways by 
adults.”); HOWELL, supra note 18, at 14 (“[D]ue to a number of ideological 
resistances and complex bureaucracy, only a small minority of theoretically 
adoptable children are in fact transferred.”). 
21 See infra notes 68-72 and accompanying text (containing examples and 
explanation of why a right to family life is not a promising basis for legally forcing 
freer inter-country adoption policies and practices). 
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and to what extent, special rights are likely to be beneficial for any 
group. 
Part 2 explains how the CRC and the Hague Convention 
exemplify the Special Rights Fallacy.  This is because they enshrine 
what I will call the “Domestic Placement Preference Principle,”22 
which gives signatory nations cover for nearly any restrictions on 
inter-country adoption that they care to impose for any reason. 
Part 3 identifies more general human rights norms that might 
better serve children whose best option, given current realities in 
their native country, is international adoption.  I also discuss how 
these norms might better support advocacy for elimination of 
barriers to international adoption.  In particular, the well-
established basic human rights of all persons to leave their country 
of origin and change their nationality—rights that any adult could 
invoke against any restriction on emigration for purposes of family 
formation (e.g., marriage)—would, for several reasons, be a better 
starting point for challenging restrictions on inter-country 
adoption than the CRC, the Hague Convention, or any other 
general human right.  Part 4 explains further why, as a matter of 
positive law, the international law documents embodying 
universal human rights, including the right to emigrate, have 
lexical priority over the conventions enumerating special rights for 
children.  In short, universal human rights instruments legally 
trump the CRC and Hague Convention. 
Part 4 examines diverse sources of interpretation of the human 
right to leave one’s country of origin and identifies the few reasons 
for limiting emigration that are recognized as legitimate.  The 
examination yields a set of principles that can form a new basis for 
assessing barriers to international adoption and for opposing 
policies that unjustifiably hold children captive to political aims 
and ideology or to the interests of others. 
Finally, Part 5 applies these principles to critique commonly 
expressed reasons for restricting inter-country adoption, and to 
generate provisional conclusions as to which types of restrictions 
on such adoption are permissible and under what circumstances.  
It concludes that existing restrictive or prohibitive policies fail the 
test of legitimacy and therefore violate the general human right to 
emigrate that children share equally with adults.  None of the 
                                                     
22 Others call this preference the “Subsidiarity Principle,” but use of that term 
leads to some confusion and offense, given that “subsidiarity” has a different 
meaning in political theory and in Catholic theology. 
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justifications that international agencies, NGOs, or national 
governments give for restricting the movement of children 
internationally for purposes of family formation would be legally 
or morally sufficient to justify restrictions on the emigration of 
adults.  Moreover, no factual differences exist between adults 
seeking to emigrate for marriage and children whose best chance 
for survival and a nurturing family life lies in inter-country 
adoption to warrant a different conclusion. 
The Article thus concludes by recommending that thwarted 
adoptive parents and bona fide child advocacy organizations file 
complaints with the United Nations Human Rights Committee in a 
representative capacity on behalf of the children harmed by 
barriers to international adoption, alleging a violation of the 
children’s human rights to leave their country of birth and to 
change their nationality.  Even if unsuccessful in triggering 
Committee action, such complaints might change the terms and 
improve the quality of debate concerning inter-country adoption. 
Nothing in this Article is intended to suggest that inter-country 
adoption is the answer to poverty, war, and other global problems 
that fall especially heavily on less-developed countries.  I fully 
support other more systemic efforts to improve conditions in 
developing countries so that a larger number of parents can 
successfully raise their offspring themselves, or, alternatively, that 
good adoptive homes can become available within those countries 
for cases where parents may be deceased or otherwise 
irremediably unable to properly care for their children.  
Nevertheless, this Article focuses on the rights of individual 
children who are currently living in those less-developed 
countries, with the conditions that currently prevail, and who do 
not have families or a reasonable prospect of being adopted within 
those countries, but who could have the opportunity to become 
part of a nurturing family and to live in a safe and healthy 
environment through inter-country adoption.  These children’s 
lives cannot be suspended pending efforts to improve conditions in 
their native country; they need nurturing parents now and are 
entitled to leave their native countries to obtain them, just as adults 
are entitled to leave their native countries to improve their life 
prospects.23 
                                                     
23 This Article also does not address immigration policy or the duty of 
developed nations to accept immigrants from poor countries generally, or of 
children for adoption purposes specifically.  As mentioned in note 5, supra, the 
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1. THE SPECIAL RIGHTS FALLACY 
We generally suppose that when a law is passed specifying 
rights for a particular group of people this must entail an 
improvement of their position.  If a legislative body goes to the 
trouble of declaring that Group A has a right not to be treated in a 
certain way, then it must be that Group A has suffered from being 
treated in that way and now its members will be better off because 
they will no longer be treated in that way.  Or if Group A will now 
have a positive right to a benefit of a particular kind, its members 
must have been denied that benefit in the past and now they will 
get it. 
However, a supposition that special rights are always and 
unqualifiedly advantageous for those upon whom they are 
conferred would clearly be false.  There is no logically necessary 
connection between receiving special rights and being better off 
than one was, or would be, without those rights.  The connection 
could fail to exist in at least four types of cases:  
1) When the special rights substitute for, yet are of less 
value substantively to the right-holder than, general rights 
previously enjoyed or otherwise available; 
2) When enforcement of the special rights is relegated to a 
separate institution with weaker powers to compel 
compliance than are held by the institutions that enforce 
general rights; 
3) When the thing the special rights guarantee is actually 
bad for the right-holders, and either the rights cannot be 
waived or the right-holders have no control over assertion 
of the right; and 
4) When interpretation and enforcement of the special 
rights are left to persons or institutions that have interests 
or aims contrary to those of the right holder. 
                                                     
U.S. State Department has created obstacles to inter-country adoption of its own.  
But those policies ostensibly arise from the same concerns that sending countries 
express in support of their policies that are hostile to foreign adoption, and not 
from the usual immigration policy concerns.  Our government wants to show 
sensitivity to sending countries’ concerns.  Eliminating or putting in better 
perspective the former set of concerns, as I aim to do in Parts IV and V, should 
persuade the State Department to remove the obstacles it has created. 
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Examples of all four exist in the history of marriage law.  With 
respect to the first, there are marital rape laws.  Historically, 
American states have had special laws dealing with marital rape, 
and insofar as they prohibit involuntary sex, one might view them 
as conferring rights on wives.  However, those laws typically have 
made rape of one’s wife a less serious offense than rape of a 
stranger.24  Thus, the special right of wives, insofar as it supplants 
more general criminal prohibitions on rape, actually makes wives 
worse off.  As to the second, insofar as the legal system has 
channeled reports of marital rape or other domestic violence into 
civil legal proceedings or into non-legal responses like counseling 
to the exclusion of a criminal law response, it has weakened 
whatever rights wives might be said to have had.  It is difficult to 
find examples of the third type—that is, special “rights” that harm 
rather than help.  But it is conceivable that during the coverture 
regime some would have characterized the legal authorization and 
societal encouragement of physical chastisement by husbands as a 
right that wives enjoyed to their husbands’ assistance in helping 
them behave properly.25  As for the fourth type, because wives’ 
separate identities disappeared as a legal matter under coverture, 
such that they could not bring suit on their own behalf, 
enforcement of their rights was left to their husbands, who in 
many contexts might have had interests or views contrary to those 
of their wives.26  
The danger that special rights might make their holders worse 
off relative to what would otherwise be the case is especially 
pronounced when the right holders do not participate in the 
process of creating the special rights, as was true with women and 
coverture law.  Today international negotiation of conventions is 
                                                     
24 See Emily J. Sack, Is Domestic Violence a Crime?: Intimate Partner Rape as 
Allegory, 24 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 535, 556 (2010) (describing state laws 
that require a higher standard of proof to establish marital rape or provide for 
lower sentences if one is found guilty of marital rape).  A contemporary example 
is the law of South Carolina.  See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-615, 16-3-652, 16-3–658 
(2012) (differentiating marital rape, which carries a potential sentence of ten years, 
from rape in the first degree, which carries a potential sentence of thirty years). 
25 See Ellen Marrus & Laura Oren, Feminist Jurisprudence and Child-Centered 
Jurisprudence: Historical Origins and Current Developments, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 671, 
675-77 (2009) (explaining that under the concept of “marital unity” women 
traditionally gave up their rights to property, personal integrity, and child 
custody).  
26 See id. at 675 (noting that traditionally women lost their separate legal 
identity upon marriage). 
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highly inclusive of autonomous adults; every affected group can 
have input.  But when negotiations concern rights for incompetent 
persons, such as children, persons other than those having the 
special rights bestowed on them are in control, and there is little 
guarantee that they will be trustworthy proxies for the right 
holders.  The danger is multiplied at the stage of implementing 
and interpreting rights. 
American constitutional doctrine relating to children suggests 
some basic guidance as to when advocates for a particular group 
should pursue a special rights agenda.  Unlike international law, 
U.S. federal law has just one fundamental-rights document, the 
Constitution, whose rights provisions apply to all persons.  Thus, 
when minors or their advocates assert rights against certain state 
acts or omissions, they invoke the same rights that adults invoke 
for themselves.  This has the advantage of establishing a starting 
point of rights equal to those of adults and imposing on the state 
the burden of explaining why children should possess those rights 
to a lesser extent than adults do.27  On the other hand, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has generally interpreted our Constitution as a 
negative-rights instrument, protective primarily of individual 
liberty against state interference, and not a positive-rights 
instrument creating entitlements to protections and benefits.  
Accordingly, it has rejected claims on behalf of children to state 
protection against violence within the home and a public school 
education of good quality.28  Children in America might benefit, 
then, from a constitutional amendment providing them with 
special rights related to the state’s child protection system or to 
education.  But advocates for children should be skeptical of any 
proposal to add a constitutional amendment purporting to bestow 
special rights on children with respect to, for example, free speech 
or search and seizure. 
Extrapolating to the international realm, advocates for 
vulnerable groups should consider, before pursuing or endorsing a 
special-rights convention for the group, whether existing general 
                                                     
27 See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 
(1969) (holding that students’ conduct in school was protected by the First 
Amendment); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (extending several procedural 
protections from the adult criminal context to juvenile delinquency cases). 
28 See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195–97 
(1989) (rejecting the claim that a child had a constitutional right to state protection 
from an abusive parent); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 
(1973) (denying the existence of a fundamental right to education). 
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human rights enactments contain provisions that could, if properly 
interpreted, give the group all that the advocates seek.  If so, they 
might focus their efforts instead on developing a jurisprudence of 
those general rights provisions that is favorable to the group.  
Promoting a special rights convention is likely to be advantageous 
only when a group has special needs that universal human rights 
cannot protect.  And in that situation, advocates should limit the 
scope of any group-specific document they promote to provisions 
needed to address the special needs. 
2. CRC AND HAGUE CONVENTION EXEMPLIFY THE SPECIAL RIGHTS 
FALLACY 
All of the ways identified in Part 1 by which the special rights 
syllogism can be fallacious are true of the CRC and the Hague 
Convention.  With the CRC, this goes beyond the adoption context.  
That convention on the whole has as much to say explicitly about 
rights of parents, and implicitly about rights of cultures and 
nations, to possess and control children as it has to say about the 
rights of children themselves.29  Moreover, an omnibus provision 
implies that interests of other people or of a nation collectively can 
properly factor into any and all decisions about children’s lives, 
rather than requiring that decisions concerning matters at the core 
                                                     
29 See CRC, supra note 16, at art. 3(2) (requiring State parties to “tak[e] into 
account the rights and duties of his or her parents”); id. at art. 5 (“States Parties 
shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents or, where applicable, 
the members of the extended family or community as provided for by local 
custom . . .”); id. at art. 14(1) (“States Parties shall respect the right of the child to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion.”); id. at art. 14(2) (“States Parties 
shall respect the rights and duties of the parents . . . to provide direction to the 
child in the exercise of his or her right . . .”); id. at art. 18(1) (“Parents . . . have the 
primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child.”).  In 
some instances, what is expressed in terms of children’s rights appears designed 
at least as much to protect interests of parents, cultural groups, or nations.  See, 
e.g., CRC at art. 7(1) (“The child shall . . . have the right . . . as far as possible . . . to 
know and be cared for by his or her parents.”); id. at art. 8(1) (“States Parties 
undertake to respect the right of the child to preserve his or her identity, including 
nationality, name and family relations as recognized by law without unlawful 
interference.”); id. at art. 9(1) (“States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be 
separated from his or her parents against their will . . .”); id. at art. 10(2) (“States 
Parties shall respect the right of the child and his or her parents to leave any 
country. . .”).  For a child-centered assessment of the pros and cons of the CRC, see 
generally Elizabeth Bartholet, Ratification by the United States of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child: Pros and Cons from a Child’s Rights Perspective, 633 ANNALS OF 
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 80 (2011). 
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of children’s lives, such as who will raise them when their parents 
cannot, rest solely on their best interests.30 
Such detractions from a singularly child-centered document 
reflect the fact that the Convention was a product of negotiation 
and compromise among adult representatives of nations with 
widely divergent agendas and different degrees of willingness to 
go down the road of recognizing children as bearers of rights.31  
For example, Islamic nations were highly resistant to attributing to 
children a right to freedom of religion, and some African countries 
opposed any language that could be read to proscribe female 
genital alteration.32  And yet, the CRC was arguably unnecessary to 
the cause of gaining for children respect as right holders, given the 
comprehensive applicability of more general international human 
rights conventions and declarations, such as the International 
Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (conferring 
numerous negative rights on “everyone”) and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
(conferring numerous positive rights on “everyone”).  Thus, on 
balance, the CRC might have been a strategic error on the part of 
advocates for children. 
In the adoption context, advocates for policies and practices 
that facilitate international adoption for the sake of unparented 
children have complained about Article 21, which appears to 
establish a strong preference for placing unparented children in 
any domestic residential situation rather than permitting a foreign 
adoption.  This Domestic Placement Preference Principle (DPP 
Principle) was included in the Convention at least in part out of 
                                                     
30 See CRC supra note 16, at art. 3(1) (“In all actions concerning children, . . . 
the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”).  This is quite 
different from saying that children’s interests shall be the sole consideration or 
even that children’s interests shall be paramount or the primary consideration.  
31 See TREVOR BUCK, INTERNATIONAL CHILD LAW 47–49 (2005) (noting the 
lengthy process of ratification); DILLON, supra note 15, at 14 (noting lack of 
enthusiasm among many countries when Poland proposed the CRC in 1978); id. at 
15 (noting that the Working Group that drafted the CRC “operated on the basis of 
consensus” rather than majority vote, giving any participating country a de facto 
veto); id. at 16 (describing politically-driven obstructionism in the CRC drafting 
process); id. at 18–19 (identifying points of especially acute disagreement, as to 
which compromises had to be reached). 
32 See HOWELL, supra note 18, at 169, 171–72 (arguing that the differences in 
culture and morals between member nations at the convention made it difficult to 
“articulate worldwide moral standards for the treatment of children”). 
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consideration for the pride of developing countries,33 and also in 
part because of Islamic countries’ opposition to any language that 
might suggest an obligation to permit adoption, a practice not 
tolerated within Islam.34  Article 21(b) requires state parties to: 
Recognize that inter-country adoption may be considered 
as an alternative means of child’s care, if the child cannot be 
placed in a foster or an adoptive family or cannot in any 
suitable manner be cared for in the child’s country of 
origin. 
Against a backdrop of long-standing blanket prohibitions on 
foreign adoption in many developing countries, this provision 
might be seen as an effort to nudge such countries toward some 
acceptance of the practice by getting them to acknowledge that 
sometimes allowing a foreign adoption is the only humane thing to 
do.  Interpreted in that way, it appears that the provision was 
intended to increase the practice of inter-country adoption.  
However, many read this provision as requiring that inter-country 
adoption be the last alternative considered, permissible only when 
there is no “suitable” place, institutional or otherwise, to house a 
child in the child’s country of origin.35  In other words, they treat 
                                                     
33 See id. at 161 (stating that many countries feel international adoption 
reflects poorly on their ability to look after their own abandoned children). 
34 See DILLON, supra note 15, at 19 (noting that, in taking into account Islam’s 
ban on adoption, Article 21 of the treaty made clear that each nation does not have 
to set up a system of adoption). 
35 See BUCK, supra note 31, at 154 (noting that the Committee has criticized 
Korea for not making international adoption a last resort); id. at 155 (stating that 
the travaux preparatoires for the CRC reflect the view that international adoption 
should be a last resort); Peter Thurnham, MP, Inter-country adoption: A view from 
the House of Commons, in INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION: PRACTICAL EXPERIENCES, 138, 
142 (Michael Humphrey and Heather Humphrey, eds., 1993) (reiterating that 
inter-country adoption is viewed as appropriate only where no other suitable 
alternative exists for the child); Carlson, supra note 15, at 736–37 (explaining that 
the CRC allows for inter-country adoption only when a child cannot find a 
suitable home anywhere else); Elizabeth Bartholet, International Adoption: Thoughts 
on the Human Rights Issues, 13 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 151, 173 (2007) (stating that 
the Chair of the U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child has interpreted 
“suitable” care in the state of origin to include foster care).  See also Guidelines for 
the Alternative Care of Children, G.A. Res. 64/142, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/142, at 
¶ 11 (Feb. 24, 2010) (“All decisions concerning alternative care should take full 
account of the desirability, in principle, of maintaining the child as close as 
possible to his/her habitual place of residence, in order to facilitate contact and 
potential reintegration with his/her family and to minimize disruption of his/her 
educational, cultural and social life.”).  But see id. ¶ 22 (“[A]lternative care for 
young children, especially those under the age of 3 years, should be provided in 
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the provision as intended to reduce the practice of inter-country 
adoption by committing state parties to making it a last resort.36  
Based on that latter interpretation, countries can defend 
extraordinarily restrictive policies concerning foreign adoption on 
the grounds that they are attempting to comply with the DPP 
Principle.  In fact, UNICEF, citing the CRC, has pressured 
impoverished nations to enact, as a condition for receiving aid, 
laws relating to foreign adoption that come close to complete 
prohibition.37 
The DPP Principle has caused an inestimable number of 
children who could have been adopted to remain in orphanages, 
many in horrendous conditions, or to live on streets because there 
was no better domestic alternative for them.38  This is an instance 
                                                     
family-based settings.”); id. ¶ 23 (prescribing “an overall deinstitutionalization 
strategy”); Bartholet, supra note 5, at 98 (stating that some regional and national 
courts have concluded that the DPP Principle is subordinate to the CRC’s 
paramount purpose to serve children’s best interests.). 
36 Cf. Elizabeth Bartholet, International Adoption: The Child’s Story, 24 GA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 333, 339 (2007) (“All this law [the CRC and Hague Convention] has 
tended to function generally to restrict rather than to facilitate international 
adoption.”). 
37 See Elizabeth Bartholet, “Bartholet Responds to Smolin” in The Debate, in 
INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION: POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND OUTCOMES 233, 247 (Judith L. 
Gibbons & Karen Smith Rotabi eds., 2012) (indicating that UNICEF benefits 
financially from getting impoverished countries to restrict foreign adoption); 
Batholet, supra note 36, at 341–42 (stating that UNICEF has used its regulatory 
power to discourage inter-country adoption); Bartholet, supra note 5, at 92 (stating 
that “UNICEF calls for policy changes designed to limit international adoption to 
last-resort status” and noting that the Human Rights Consultative Committee 
opposed Madonna’s adoption of a child from Malawi by “arguing that under the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child institutional care was preferred to 
international adoption”); id. at 93 (noting that UNICEF has called for elimination 
of private intermediaries, which in some countries play a crucial role in 
international adoption, and that “[s]uch foster care as now exists in poor countries 
is often quite terrible, ‘a euphemism for cottage industry-level 
institutionalization’”); Letter to Prime Minister Regarding Inter-Country 
Adoption from UNICEF Romania Media Center (February 6, 2004) reprinted in 
DILLON, supra note 15, at 507 (“[I]nter-country adoption is to be considered as an 
exceptional measure and last resort . . . .”). 
38 See LAURIE AHERN ET AL., MENTAL DISABILITY RTS. INT’L, HIDDEN SUFFERING: 
ROMANIA’S SEGREGATION AND ABUSE OF INFANTS AND CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES 
(2006), available at www.crin.org/docs/mhri_rom.pdf (describing institutions 
housing unparented children in Romania); Bartholet, supra note 5, at 93 (alluding 
to reports on orphanages in Vietnam, Guatemala, and Romania after those 
countries imposed moratoria on international adoption); Bartholet, supra note 5,  
at 95 (citing estimates that 8 million children are living in orphanages around the 
world and 100 million are living on the streets); Children in Residential Institutions 
Desperately Vulnerable to Abuse, UNICEF PRESS CENTER (May 31, 2005), 
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of the fourth problem with special rights for children—that is, that 
their interpretation and enforcement is left in the hands of public 
officials, governing institutions, and private organizations who 
purport to be agents for children, ostensibly promoting their 
welfare and enforcing their rights, but who in reality might serve 
other people and other aims and end up causing great harm to 
children.39 
Another version of the DPP Principle has been read into the 
Hague Convention.  That Convention begins in its preamble by 
“[r]ecognizing that intercountry adoption may offer the advantage 
of a permanent family to a child for whom a suitable family cannot 
be found in his or her State of origin.”  Article 4, which is more of a 
directive than is the preamble, states: 
An adoption within the scope of the Convention shall take 
place only if the competent authorities of the State of origin 
. . . have determined, after possibilities for placement of the 
child within the State of origin have been given due 
consideration, that an intercountry adoption is in the child’s 
best interests.40 
The preamble language might be read to prioritize foreign 
adoption above domestic foster care or institutional care, if those 
do not provide a child with a “family,” and thus to suggest a 
weaker DPP Principle than that of CRC Article 21.  But 
intercountry adoption opponents and skeptics can plausibly 
maintain that at a minimum it requires giving priority to domestic 
adoption applicants, if there are or might be any who meet the 
minimalist standard of “suitable,” regardless of whether a foreign 
placement would be better for a child. 
Ordinarily, though, directive articles in a code have more 
weight than preamble language, so Article 4 should be controlling 
in assessing whether states’ policies conform to the Hague 
Convention.  Yet Article 4 is vague and ambiguous, particularly in 
                                                     
www.unicef.org/infobycountry/media_27185.html (discussing Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia).  I do not mean to suggest that there are sufficient adoption 
seekers to provide a family for all children of the world living in orphanages or on 
streets. 
39 See also Herszenhorn, supra note 13 (stating that Russia’s ombudsman for 
children is among the strongest defenders of the government’s decision to 
prohibit Americans from adopting Russian children). 
40 Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in respect of 
Intercountry Adoption preamble art. 4, May 29, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1139.  
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its use of the term “due consideration.”  Arguably it requires no 
more than that state parties give consideration contemporaneously 
in every case to both domestic applicants, if there are any at that 
moment, and foreign applicants.  It would seem consistent with the 
terms of this provision for a state to choose foreign applicants over 
domestic applicants based simply on a finding that the inter-
country adoption would be, all things considered, better for the 
child than a domestic adoption.  On the other hand, Article 4 does 
not clearly require states to approve the best option for children.  It 
appears to permit states to favor domestic adoption, and indeed 
domestic foster care or institutional care, if they wish to do so and 
even if that is not in children’s best interests.41  In fact, the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law took that position in 
guidance it issued in 2008.42 
Thus, Article 4 and other provisions in the Hague Convention43 
collectively establish just this set of rules:  1) States may approve 
foreign adoptions when it is in a child’s best interests, and 2) States 
must not approve foreign adoptions that are not in a child’s best 
interests.  What the Convention does not dictate is that state parties 
must permit international adoption when it is in children’s best 
                                                     
41 See Elizabeth Bartholet, The Hague Convention: Pros, Cons, and Potential 2  
(Sept. 5, 2013) (forthcoming), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/ 
bartholet/pubs.php (“The Hague’s negative impact is a result of the fact that 
policy makers have ignored its positive aspects, have misinterpreted it as more 
restrictive than it was intended to be . . . .”); Smolin, supra note 14, at 447–62 
(stating that the Hague Convention was in fact aimed simply at trying to reduce 
the buying and stealing of children, not at establishing placement priorities). 
42 See Bartholet, supra note 5, at 93 (explaining that UNICEF contends the 
Hague Convention supports its position that in country adoption and even 
permanent foster care is preferable to intercountry adoption).  The U.S. State 
Department appears to interpret the Convention as requiring states to complete a 
search for domestic adopters before considering foreign applicants.  See, e.g., U.S. 
Dept. of State, Georgia, supra note 7 (“[T]he Convention requires that Georgia 
attempt to place a child with a family in-country before determining that a child is 
eligible for intercountry adoption.”). 
43 Article 1 of the Convention contains the non-committal language:  “The 
objects of the present Convention are . . . to establish safeguards to ensure that 
intercountry adoptions take place in the best interests of the child and with 
respect for his or her fundamental rights as recognized in international law . . .” 
Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation, supra note 40, at art. 1.  
That language could be read to say only that international adoption should not 
occur if it is not in a child’s best interests or is contrary to the child’s fundamental 
rights.  It says at least that.  It is debatable whether it commands that international 
adoptions must take place when that is in a child’s best interests or suggests that 
children might have a fundamental right to be available for international 
adoption.  
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interests.  It leaves states free to refuse foreign adoptions even 
when children would be far better off by being adopted 
internationally.  In fact, the Hague Convention does not clearly 
commit state parties to allow foreign adoption at all in any 
circumstances.44 
In any event, UNICEF accords greater weight to the CRC 
provision regarding inter-country adoption, and that agency, 
because of its control over substantial U.N. aid money, drives 
policy in the least developed parts of the world—that is, in 
countries where there is likely to be the greatest number of 
children needing to be adopted.45  Moreover, whereas all nations of 
the world other than the United States and Somalia are parties to 
the CRC, most nations are not parties to the Hague Convention.46 
In short, although the CRC and the Hague Convention might in 
some ways have improved the lives of some children in some parts 
of the world,47 they have also arguably harmed many children in 
certain ways.  Reasonable people can disagree about what those 
ways are, but no one can reasonably deny that creating special 
rights for children presents this danger—that is, that children 
might as a result have less protection than they would have in the 
absence of those special rights.  This is true simply as a conceptual 
matter, as explained above. 
                                                     
44 See Lynn D. Wardle, The Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption and 
American Implementing Law: Implications for International Adoptions by Gay and 
Lesbian Couples or Partners, 18 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 113, 144 (2008) 
(“Ironically, encouraging intercountry adoption is not one of the formal objectives 
of the Convention.”). 
45 See Bartholet, supra note 41, at 2 (“UNICEF, the UN Committee on the 
Rights of the Child, and others defer to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC) in its preference for in-country foster care over out of country adoption.”); 
Bartholet, supra note 5, at 92–93 (stating that UNICEF disfavors intercountry 
adoption and supports the development of in-country adoption alternatives).  See 
also BUCK, supra note 31, at 157 (reading the preamble to the Hague Convention as 
signaling that it is subordinate to, and should be interpreted consistent with, the 
CRC). 
46 See Convention Countries, INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION: U.S. DEP’T OF STATE 
(Aug. 2013), http://adoption.state.gov/hague_convention/countries.php (listing 
89 countries as parties to the convention); U.S. Bureau of Intelligence & Research, 
Independent States in the World, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Jan. 3, 2012), available at 
http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/4250.htm (charting the 195 independent states 
in the world). 
47 But see DILLON, supra note 15, at 6 (“[T]here seems to be no area of 
children’s rights where solid improvement can be cited as a result of the UNCRC. 
. . . [A]ll negative indicators seem to be worsening, some dramatically so.”). 
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With respect to inter-country adoption, any nation could justify 
any restriction on it simply by citing the CRC’s preference for 
domestic placements.48  It is not clear, for example, that Russia has 
violated the CRC by shutting down adoption by Americans, even 
though it means many thousands of children, including many 
disabled children, will never have a family life.49  It is not clear that 
either the CRC or the Hague Convention provides a basis for 
condemning Eritrea for its recently-enacted policy of refusing to 
allow foreign adoption unless at least one adoptive parent is of 
Eritrean heritage and has completed national service, which is 
tantamount to not permitting foreign adoption at all.50  Or for its 
former policy of requiring non-citizen adoptive parents to live in 
Eritrea with the child for six months, a policy that helps explain 
why Americans adopted only four Eritrean children in 2010.51  Yet 
Eritrea is one of the most impoverished nations on earth and likely 
has tens of thousands of children orphaned by famine, disease, and 
violence.  Its adoption policies force such children to live and die in 
miserable and dangerous circumstances despite the willingness of 
people in more developed countries to adopt them.52 
                                                     
48 In theory, a party to the CRC would also need to give the U.N. Children’s 
Rights Committee some explanation as to why a particular restriction is consistent 
with treatment of children’s welfare as “a primary consideration” in its decision 
making.  See CRC, supra note 16, at art. 3 (committing signatory nations to making 
children’s best interests “a primary consideration” in matters affecting them).  But 
that Committee is quite supportive of the DPP and so likely to be an easy 
audience for such an explanation.  See sources cited supra note 35 (discussing 
various interpretations of DPP article 21(b)).  
49 See Herszenhorn, supra note 13 (“Deputy Prime Minister Olga Golodets 
noted that Russia currently has a database of 128,000 orphans eligible for adoption 
but only about 18,000 prospective families willing to adopt . . . Alla V. Prozorova, 
an adoption facilitator . . . who has worked in the field of international adoptions 
for 14 years, said . . . ‘People who are involved in this problem—I mean even 
higher-level authorities—they know only Americans really volunteer to adopt 
special needs children . . . No Italian, no French, no Germans.’”).  Russia is not a 
party to the Hague Convention. 
50 See U.S. Dep’t of State, Eritrea, INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION: BUREAU OF 
CONSULAR AFFAIRS (July 2013),  http://adoption.state.gov/country_information/ 
country_specific_info.php?country-select=eritrea (stating the requirements to 
adopt a child from Eritrea into the United States).  
51 See id. 
52 See Xan Rice, Eritrea ‘Like a Giant Prison’, Claims Human Rights Group, THE 
GUARDIAN (Apr. 16, 2009, 5:49 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/ 
apr/16/eritrea-africa-human-rights-refugees (stating that young people who are 
trying to flee the country are shot at the border and even if they are successful in 
escaping their parents will be made to suffer); 20 Poorest Countries in the World, 
THE RICHEST (May 27, 2012, 6:50 AM), 
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3. GENERAL HUMAN RIGHTS PERTINENT TO INTER-COUNTRY 
ADOPTION 
Supporters of international adoption should therefore step back 
and away from these special children’s rights instruments and 
think about how more general human rights instruments apply to 
the plight of children who are living on streets or in orphanages in 
countries where there is little or no prospect for them to have a 
decent life in a permanent family.  What seems to have escaped the 
notice of most scholars, diplomats, and advocates is that 
international and regional conventions conferring human rights on 
all persons can support arguments for state policies and practices 
more favorable to inter-country adoption.  Nearly everyone’s 
instinct is to look at the special conventions relating to children and 
to look no further.53  Yet if a similar predicament arose for any 
adults, we would look to general human rights instruments with 
confidence that we would find in them an adequate basis for 
ascribing to those adults a right comparable to what adoption 
proponents seek for children. 
What would be a similar predicament?  At issue for children in 
connection with international adoption is their ability to leave their 
country of origin to form a family relationship with individuals in 
another country who want to form that relationship and whose 
country is willing to let them immigrate for that purpose.  This 
right is the same thing desired by any adults in Russia or 
Guatemala or China who want to leave their country of origin and 
go to the U.S. or the U.K. or Germany in order to marry citizens of 
those countries.  Those other countries are open to their 
immigration for the purpose of forming a family relationship with 
a citizen, just as they have been open to immigration of adopted 
children.54  And if any of those sending countries blocked the 
departure of such adults seeking to enter into family relationships 
in any of those receiving countries, these adults could file 
                                                     
http://www.therichest.org/world/poorest-countries-in-the-world/ (including 
Eritrea as one of the twenty poorest countries in the world and explaining that its 
economic conditions have not improved in recent years). 
53 Cf. BUCK, supra note 31, at 47 (observing that the CRC “has established 
itself as the central international instrument on children’s rights”).  
54 See Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage, 91 MINN. 
L. REV. 1625, 1650–52 (2007) (stating that the annual number of fiancé visas 
approved by the Department of Homeland Security has been increasing and that 
the United States frequently allows immigration for the purposes of marriage).  
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complaints with the U.N.’s Human Rights Committee and with 
regional human rights adjudicative bodies.  Absent compelling 
justification of a particular sort, the sending countries would be 
found in violation of treaty obligations and human rights.  Which 
human rights? 
3.1. The Right to Leave and Change Nationality 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which 
begins with “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal 
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family . . . ,”55 
unqualifiedly states:  “[e]veryone has the right to leave any country, 
including his own . . . .”56  Virtually identical language appears in 
the more binding ICCPR and in several regional treaties.57  One 
hundred sixty-seven of the world’s one hundred ninety-five 
independent states are parties to the ICCPR, including nations that 
have severely limited or entirely prohibited foreign adoptions such 
as Guatemala, Eritrea, and Russia.  The list of member countries 
also includes major adoption receiving countries such as the 
United States.58  The UDHR further proclaims: “[n]o one shall be 
                                                     
55 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, preamble, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR] (emphasis added).  
See also id. at art. 1 (“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and 
rights.”); id. at art. 2 (“Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth 
in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind . . . .”). 
56 Id. at art. 13, ¶ 2 (emphasis added).  Though on the surface merely a 
resolution without force of law, the UDHR is generally regarded as having 
acquired the status of customary international law, and the United Nations’ 
General Assembly has stated that some of its provisions “constitute basic 
principles of international law.”  Lawrence O. Gostin & Benjamin E. Berkman, 
Pandemic Influenza: Ethics, Law, and the Public’s Health, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 121, 143 
(2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
57 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 12 ¶ 2, Dec. 19, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (“Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his 
own.”) [hereinafter ICCPR]; see also Organization of American States, American 
Convention on Human Rights art. 22 ¶2, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 
U.N.T.S. 123 (“Every person has the right to leave any country freely, including 
his own.”); Protocol No. 4 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms art. 2 ¶ 2, Sept. 16, 1963, 7 I.L.M. 978, 979 (“Everyone 
shall be free to leave any country, including his own.”).  The CRC actually 
contains similar language, but attributes the right to children and parents in such 
a way as to suggest a jointly-exercised right was intended.  See CRC, supra note 16, 
at art. 10 (“Parties shall respect the right of the child and his or her parents to 
leave any country, including their own . . . .”).  
58 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Signatories), UNITED 
NATIONS TREATY SERIES DATABASE, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/UNTS 
Online.aspx?id=1 (select “Title Search” tab; then search “Match this phrase” 
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. . . denied the right to change his nationality.”59  Regional treaties 
contain similar pronouncements.60  These are more explicit and 
direct pronouncements of a right that lies at the core of what 
advocates for unparented children seek—namely, a right against 
the government of the children’s country of origin preventing them 
from leaving even when that is best for them.  As reflected in the 
international tribunal proceedings discussed in Part 4 below, states 
infringe this right not only when they impose an outright 
prohibition on emigration but also when they create unwarranted 
practical obstacles to emigration.61 
This right of emigration is an especially strong one among 
human rights today, as evidenced by the relative rarity of its 
infringement with respect to adults in recent decades, despite the 
interest states might have in preventing the exit of their most 
talented citizens or their most vocal critics; the widespread 
condemnation of nations that have denied their citizens freedom to 
leave;62 and the fact that some countries assert the right of 
                                                     
criteria selection for “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”; then 
follow “See Details” hyperlink for Registration Number I-14668) (listing state 
parties).   
59 UDHR, supra note 55, at art. 15, ¶ 2.  
60 See, e.g., American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, art. XIX, 
adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States (Apr. 30, 1948), 
reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American 
System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.92, doc. 31 rev. 3 at 17 (1996) (“Every person has the 
right to the nationality to which he is entitled by law and to change it, if he so 
wishes, for the nationality of any other country that is willing to grant it to him.”); 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 12 ¶ 2, June 27, 1981, 1520 
U.N.T.S. 217 (“Every individual shall have the right to leave any country 
including his own . . . .”). 
61 See, e.g., Alice Huling, Domestic Workers in Malaysia: Hidden Victims of Abuse 
and Forced Labor, 44 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 629, 659 (2012) (“Everyone should 
have the right to leave any country . . . . These rights are effectively denied when 
employers keep their workers’ passports and the immigration laws are such that 
individuals cannot exit their workplace without their papers.”). 
62 See Kieran Oberman, Can Brain Drain Justify Immigration Restrictions?, 123 
ETHICS 427, 431 (2013) (citing the former Soviet Union and East Germany as states 
condemned for violating the right to emigrate); Eric Retter, Comment, You Can 
Check Out Any Time You Like, But We Might Not Let You Leave: Cuba’s Travel Policy 
in the Wake of Signing the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 23 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 651, 659 (2009) (“Throughout much of its Marxist regime, 
Cuba has been harshly criticized from the outside for its . . . travel laws . . . .”); 
Cox News Service, Soviets Sought Pledge Athletes Couldn’t Defect, OTTAWA CITIZEN, 
May 17, 1984, at 1 (indicating that the Soviets’ request that the Reagan 
Administration return to Soviet custody any Soviet athletes who sought to defect 
during the Los Angles Summer Olympic Games was “promptly rejected as 
morally and politically objectionable”); Yevgenia Pismennaya & Yekaterina 
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emigration as an excuse for not acting more aggressively to 
prevent human trafficking.63  Indeed, political theorists view 
respect for the right of exit as a pre-condition for the very 
legitimacy and sovereignty of a nation.64  Invoking it as a basis for 
opposing any country’s restrictions or prohibitions on adoption by 
foreigners therefore imposes a much more demanding burden of 
justification on such a country than does the CRC or the Hague 
Convention, as explained further below. 
A related human right is one against arbitrary detention.65  This 
right is arguably an even stronger human right, generally treated 
as a “peremptory norm” from which derogation is impermissible.66  
One could plausibly argue that foreclosing foreign adoption 
amounts to detention, at least for children with readily identifiable 
potential foreign adoptive parents and no prospect for joining a 
family domestically; the country’s policy in effect causes them to 
remain in state custody rather than going to a home that awaits 
them.  It seems unlikely, though, that any international body 
would view a state’s inhibiting foreign adoption as detention.  The 
prototypical form of detention is holding in a prison-like facility 
persons who otherwise could be and would be living freely in the 
community.  Some legal authorities might regard that right as 
always inapt in the case of infants, given that young children must 
always be in someone’s custody, and especially inapt in the case of 
                                                     
Kravchenko, Jackson-Vanik Amendment Could Be Lifted, THE MOSCOW TIMES, April 
26, 2010, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/print/article/jackson-vanik-
amendment-could-be-lifted/404772.html (discussing 1974 federal U.S. law that 
“limited trade with countries of the socialist bloc that stopped their citizens from 
emigrating by denying most favored nation status”).  See also Megan J. Ballard, 
Post-Conflict Property Restitution: Flawed Legal and Theoretical Foundations, 28 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 462, 480 (2010) (“Between the end of World War II and the 
conclusion of the Cold War in the late 1980s, Western governments that supported 
the United Nations emphasized the right to leave much more than the right to 
return.”).  
63 See, e.g., Roza Pati, States’ Positive Obligations with Respect to Human 
Trafficking: The European Court of Human Rights Breaks New Ground in Rantsev v. 
Cyprus and Russia, 29 B.U. INT’L L. J. 79, 91 (2011) (noting this argument by 
Russia). 
64 See Carter Dillard, The Primary Right, 29 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 860, 865 (2012) 
(“[O]ne ought to be able to choose to consent or not consent to any and all 
political systems”). 
65 UDHR, supra note 55, at art. 9 (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary 
arrest, detention or exile.”). 
66 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 
702 cmts. d-i (1987); id. at § 102 cmt. k. 
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infants who lack private caregivers and who are therefore 
inevitably in state custody.   Moreover, preventing emigration for 
adoption purposes, while legally authorizing placement of a child 
in any suitable and available home within the country, is 
conceptually much less restrictive than is de jure confinement of 
someone to an institution, even if as a practical matter refusing 
emigration means the person must remain in a state institution, 
because no other domestic residential placement is available.  
Analogously, if an adult were living in some country’s state-run 
homeless shelter, because she had no family in that country and no 
income, and had an opportunity to marry and live with someone 
in another country but was denied the freedom to emigrate, we 
would not characterize her situation as one of detention.  We 
would simply say that her right to leave the country is being 
infringed.  Violation of the right to emigrate seems the best way 
also to conceptualize the wrong done to children whose only or 
best opportunity for family life is in another country and who 
suffer loss of that opportunity because of their native country’s 
policies relating to foreign adoption per se. 
The ICCPR does qualify the right to leave any country, 
authorizing restrictions on that right that “are necessary to protect 
national security, public order . . . , public health or morals or the 
rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other 
rights recognized in the present Covenant.”67  Such qualifications 
leave much room for interpretation—Part 4 below canvasses the 
interpretations that different tribunals and scholars have given to 
them.  Nevertheless, they confine the range of possible 
justifications, whereas the CRC’s DPP Principle appears to allow 
for any justification, or no justification, to suffice for denying 
children the opportunity to emigrate in order to have a family. 
Further, the ICCPR’s requirement that any restrictions be 
consistent with other rights embodied in it should mean that any 
restriction imposed on the exit of children presumptively must 
apply also to adults, because Article 2 of the ICCPR establishes a 
                                                     
67 ICCPR, supra note 57, at art. 12 ¶ 3.  The UDHR lists, as an additional 
potential justification for infringing the rights it pronounces, “meeting the just 
requirements of . . . the general welfare in a democratic society.”  UDHR, supra 
note 55, at art. 29 ¶ 2.  The drafters of the ICCPR, however, rejected that basis for 
denying the right to emigrate.  Jeffrey Barist et al., Who May Leave: A Review of 
Soviet Practice Restricting Emigration on Grounds of Knowledge of “State Secrets” in 
Comparison with Standards of International Law and the Policies of Other States, 15 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 381, 388 (1987). 
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right to equal treatment for all persons.  This requirement 
reinforces a further advantage that invoking general human rights 
documents will generally provide for those advocating on behalf of 
children—namely, that interpretation in any particular case of the 
content of the right and permissible infringements should be 
constrained by precedents and other official guidance covering a 
broad range of cases and involving a variety of right holders in a 
variety of situations.  Interpretation is thus less likely to be sui 
generis than if a group-specific right were at issue. 
3.2. Other General Human Rights 
In addition to the direct protections of freedom to emigrate, 
numerous international instruments pronounce other types of 
rights for all humans that could form a less direct or more 
contingent basis for objecting to restrictive international adoption 
policies.  For example, Elizabeth Bartholet has argued against such 
policies on the basis of a human right to family life,68 some version 
of which appears in the ICCPR, the UDHR, and a few regional 
treaties.69 
A ‘right to family’ on the surface might seem more apt in the 
context of adoption.  But it supports international adoption only 
contingently, indirectly, and weakly.  It is actually a quite 
                                                     
68 Bartholet led an appeal to the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, on the basis of provisions in the American Convention on Human Rights, 
for assistance in getting Latin American nations to reopen international adoption.  
The appeal rested in part on language in that Convention relating specifically to 
children, conferring on them a right to “special protection, care and aid,” but it 
also cited the universally applicable “right of every person to a family.”  Hearing 
on Human Rights of Unparented Children and Related International Adoption Policies, 
Inter-Am. Comm’n H. R., 137th Ordinary Period of Sessions, (2009) (written 
testimony of Delegation), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/ 
about/cap/ia/testimonyfullnov09.pdf.  See also Paulo Barrozo, Finding Home in 
the World: A Deontological Theory of the Right to be Adopted, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 
701, 704–05 (2010-11) (urging the right to family life as a normative basis for 
opposing restrictions on inter-country adoption).  A ‘right of children to special 
care’ is a special right, and so invites sui generis interpretations.  It is also phrased 
as a positive right, and so lacks the normative force negative rights carry.  
Additionally, it is quite vague, allowing a country to avoid a charge of violating 
the right by asserting any minimally plausible account of how that country is 
extending special care to children.  The same is true of invocation of CRC’s Article 
3 provision committing signatory nations to making children’s best interests “a 
primary consideration” in matters affecting them.  CRC, supra note 16, at art. 3.  In 
addition to being vague, the phrasing of Article 3 actually suggests countries 
should balance other primary considerations against children’s welfare.  Id. 
69 See sources cited infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text. 
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amorphous concept.  One thing it might mean is an entitlement to 
form or join a family rather than remain alone or in an institution.  
But it is difficult to find a textual basis for children’s having that 
right; human rights documents typically confer the right to form a 
family expressly just on adults.70  Moreover, as applied to 
unparented children, it would seem to be a minimalist conception, 
just guaranteeing some family to belong to.  A country might 
plausibly defend prohibition of foreign adoption by claiming that 
it is seeking families domestically, thereby putting critics in the 
position of having to show that no families are available 
domestically for many or most unparented children or that the 
country’s search efforts are irremediably inadequate.  As such, the 
right does not support a direct facial attack on a strong in-country 
placement preference. 
Moreover, the more common articulation and interpretation of 
a human right relating to family life makes it a protection of 
existing family relationships.71  Not only does that not support 
advocacy for more adoptions but in fact a government could 
invoke entitlement to such protection as a justification for fewer 
foreign adoptions.  “Family” can include distant relatives, even 
unknown blood relatives if interpreted in a biological sense.  As 
such, a country could invoke the right to protection of family life in 
support of a policy to scour the countryside indefinitely looking for 
any kin who might be willing to take custody of an 
                                                     
70 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 57, at art. 23 ¶ 2 (“The right of men and women 
of marriageable age to marry and to found a family shall be recognized.”);   
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms art. 12, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (“Men and women of 
marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family . . . .”); American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, supra note 60, at art. VI (applying to 
Latin American sending countries and announcing without any age qualification 
that “[e]very person has the right to establish a family . . .”); UDHR, supra note 55, 
at art. 16 ¶1 (“Men and women of full age . . . have the right to marry and to 
found a family.”). 
71 See, e.g., ICCPR supra note 57, at art. 17 ¶ 1 (“No one shall be subjected to 
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence . . . .”); id. at art. 23 ¶ 1 (“The family is the natural and 
fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the 
State.”); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 70, at art. 8 (“Everyone has the right to respect 
for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.”); African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, supra note 60, at art. 18 (“The family shall 
be the natural unit and basis of society. It shall be protected by the State . . . .”); 
UDHR, supra note 55, at art. 12, 16(3)  (”No one shall be subjected to arbitrary 
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence . . . .”). 
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institutionalized child, rather than permitting foreign non-kin to 
adopt a child.72 
In addition to family-related human rights, international 
conventions establish rights relating to personal development and 
opportunity that could be relevant to the plight of unparented 
children in impoverished, war-torn, or otherwise inhospitable 
nations.  The UDHR pronounces rights to “security of person” 
(Article 3), “the economic, social, and cultural rights indispensable 
for his dignity and the free development of his personality” 
(Article 22), and “education” (Article 26(1)).  The ICESCR declares 
“the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living” (Article 
11(1)), “the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger” 
(Article 11(2)), “the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health” (Article 
12(1)), “the right of everyone to education” (Article 13(1)), and “the 
right of everyone . . . to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress” 
(Article 15(1)(b)).  The CRC contains similar provisions 
pronouncing a right of children to have their basic needs met,73 but 
those provisions compete with the CRC’s more specific DPP 
Principle in the context of adoption policy.  Therefore, invoking the 
super-ordinate and more readily enforceable ICESCR rights should 
add greater weight to a basic-needs argument for international 
adoption. 
These rights to basic goods, however, are positive rights—
vaguely phrased and qualified by language providing that a state 
should undertake to provide the enumerated benefits and 
opportunities “to the maximum of its available resources, with a 
view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights 
                                                     
72 See, e.g., David Smolin, “Smolin’s Position” in The Debate, supra note 37, at 
239 (endorsing a strong DPP in part on the grounds that “as a matter of 
widespread cultural practice, human need, and fundamental rights, the family 
into which the child is born extends beyond the parents, and beyond the nuclear 
family, to include an inter-generational and extensive family group”). 
73 See, e.g., CRC, supra note 16, at art. 6(2) (“States Parties shall ensure to the 
maximum extent possible the survival and development of the child.”); id. at art. 
23(1) (“States Parties recognize that a mentally or physically disabled child should 
enjoy a full and decent life, in conditions which ensure dignity, promote self-
reliance and facilitate the child’s active participation in the community.”); id. at 
art. 24(1) (“States Parties recognize the right of the child to the enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of health and to facilities for the treatment of illness 
and rehabilitation of health.”); id. at art. 27(1) (“States Parties recognize the right 
of every child to a standard of living adequate for the child’s physical, mental, 
spiritual, moral and social development.”); id. at art. 28(1) (“States Parties 
recognize the right of the child to education . . . .”). 
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recognized in the present Covenant.”74  Moreover, the drafters and 
signatories of these pronouncements likely presupposed that such 
rights would be effectuated, if at all, by ensuring that everywhere 
in the world these goods exist for everyone, not by facilitating 
international migration.  They might have supposed this simply 
because the only way its drafter could envision for any person to 
actually have these things would be for conditions to improve 
where that person currently lives. 
Of course, the dream of hospitable social and economic 
conditions everywhere in the world will not come true in our 
lifetimes and, in the meantime, there is an alternative way to 
effectuate such rights for many people—namely, emigrating to a 
better place.  Thus, an adult seeking to emigrate for marriage 
purposes, but whose native country inhibits her exit, might 
plausibly assert these economic and opportunity rights, as well as a 
right of emigration, if family-related emigration would 
dramatically transform her economic situation and opportunities 
for a fulfilling life.  Those rights provisions could be interpreted as 
not merely assertions of positive right—that is, a right to 
assistance—but also as assertions of negative right—that is, a right 
against state obstruction of any person’s opportunities for a better 
life through migration.75   And because these human rights, like the 
more direct rights to leave one’s country and change one’s 
nationality, belong to “everyone,” not just adults, advocates for 
children who are living in inhospitable places could also invoke 
these provisions as bases for demanding that the governing 
authority in those places remove unwarranted restrictions on 
emigration for purposes of family formation. 
Still, because the rights to exit and change nationality provide a 
more direct and clearly negative-rights basis than other general 
human rights for opposing restrictions on inter-country adoption, 
the remainder of the Article focuses primarily on them.  Invoking 
some other rights could lend useful support to that core argument. 
                                                     
74 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 2, Dec. 
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.  See also Tamar Ezer, A Positive Right to Protection for 
Children, 7 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1 (2004) (explaining the weakness of positive 
rights, relative to negative rights, in international and American jurisprudence). 
75 The right to migration within the European Union rests largely on this 
connection to social and economic opportunity.  See Natalie Shimmel, Welcome to 
Europe, but Please Stay Out: Freedom of Movement and the May 2004 Expansion of the 
European Union, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 760, 764–69 (2006) (describing how the 
freedom of movement for workers furthers political and economic integration). 
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This support is less clear regarding the right to family life, because 
it might be, as explained above, a double-edged sword.  But 
advocacy for freer inter-country adoption could gain much moral 
weight by reminding sending nations and international 
enforcement agencies of every person’s human right to basic 
necessities for physical and cognitive development, a right that  
goes tragically yet avoidably unfulfilled for unparented children in 
many countries, and by arguing that refusing to allow children in 
state-operated institutions to leave the country effectively amounts 
to arbitrary detention. 
3.3. Advantages of Invoking General Human Rights 
Appeal to universal human rights presents numerous 
advantages over reliance on special-rights conventions, including 
those mentioned above.  First, the general-rights documents clearly 
announce a strong right against restrictions on emigration, 
whereas neither the CRC nor the Hague Convention clearly confers 
on unparented children any right against state-imposed obstacles 
to their leaving their country of origin to join a family and live in 
more hospitable circumstances.76  Relatedly, the UDHR and ICCPR 
clearly create a presumption against restrictions on emigration and 
impose on the country of origin the burden of proving that any 
particular restriction is necessary to serve an enumerated 
legitimate aim.  They implicitly declare to each state:  “You do not 
own the people who live on your territory, and you need 
exceedingly compelling reason to stop them from leaving.”  By 
contrast, the CRC and Hague Convention implicitly suppose that 
states have an entitlement to retain children, and they do not 
appear to demand any justification whatsoever, on the part of state 
parties, for restrictions on children’s emigration for adoption.  
They suggest a conception of the state as arrogant owner of 
unparented children, for whom it is supererogatory to listen to 
pleas made on behalf of these children that the state relinquish its 
hold on them so they can have a family—a conception well 
exemplified by Russia’s behavior in 2012. 
Further, as noted above, invoking universal human rights 
creates a check against illicit sui generis reasoning about children, 
because interpretation of these rights occurs in a variety of settings 
                                                     
76 As noted above, the CRC does mention the right to leave a country, but 
appears to confer it on parents, or on children only when exiting with a parent, 
rather than on children individually. 
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involving people of many sorts—including autonomous adults—
and adjudicative bodies typically aim for consistent interpretation 
of rights provisions across contexts.  Related to this point about 
generalizing interpretations and justifications, appeal to general 
human rights instruments can also put important empirical issues 
in a different light.  For example, the DPP Principle cites an 
ostensibly child-centered justification:  the supposed interest of 
children in growing up within the culture of their state or local 
community of origin.  Invoking the right of everyone to leave his 
or her country of origin places this concern in a broader context 
and invites the question whether it is a sufficient reason to stop 
anyone and everyone from emigrating, as a matter of state 
restriction or individual self-determination.  It would be 
implausible to say it is so with respect to any adult who wishes to 
leave his or her country in order to marry someone in the United 
States or Western Europe.  International tribunals would 
undoubtedly reject as a justification for detaining such a person the 
paternalistic concern that the adult would suffer by separation 
from his or her culture.  They would do so not only because of an 
aversion to paternalistic restrictions on autonomous adults (much 
of the world is not averse to such paternalism), but also because 
the concern is quite speculative and relatively insignificant when 
compared with the benefits many stand to gain by emigrating.  Yet 
such a concern about deprivation of culture is arguably less 
significant in relation to infants and toddlers, who have little or no 
experience or awareness of the culture of their place of origin. 
Another important advantage of invoking general human 
rights of the sort that the UDHR and the ICCPR contain is that 
there is more robust enforcement of those rights than there is of 
any rights or guidance that the children’s conventions contain.77 
International law enforcement is, as a general matter, weaker than 
domestic law enforcement,78 and I am by no means suggesting that 
filing complaints with the HRC under the ICCPR would quickly 
eliminate obstacles to international adoption.  But, the CRC is 
                                                     
77 Cf. DILLON, supra note 15, at 4 (“Nowhere is the gap between international 
‘norm production’ and effective remedies more striking than in the case of 
children’s rights.”). 
78 See generally John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International 
Institutions, INT’L SECURITY, Winter 1994–95, at 5.  But see Andrew T. Guzman, 
International Tribunals: A Rational Choice Analysis, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 171 (2008) 
(arguing that there are many ways in which international tribunals are effective 
even if not in the way we ordinarily expect of domestic courts). 
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especially weak among international rights instruments.79  Its only 
compliance mechanism consists of state parties’ reporting, every 
five years, to a supervising body—the Committee on the Rights of 
the Child—that has no authority to order any change in any 
country’s practices, even if it were disposed to do so.80  The 
Committee can only “make suggestions” for improvement.81  The 
CRC reporting system is the equivalent of counseling for marital 
rape:  every once in a while you check in with a supposed expert to 
let them know how you are doing, and to receive advice on how to 
do better.  There is an appearance of addressing problems, but little 
reason to expect a change in behavior.  And the only recourse for 
Hague Convention violations is for other parties to the Convention 
to refuse to do business,82 which is no recourse at all when the 
alleged violation is unwarranted restrictions on international 
adoption. 
By contrast, the ICCPR and its Rules of Procedure not only 
mandate that countries report their compliance, but also authorize 
state parties to file complaints against other state parties for human 
rights violations and, pursuant to a widely-adopted Optional 
Protocol, authorize individuals or their proxies to file complaints 
against states with the HRC for human rights violations—
including violations of the right to emigrate.83  The HRC issues 
                                                     
79 See John J. Garman, International Law and Children’s Human Rights: 
International, Constitutional, and Political Conflicts Blocking Passage of the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 659, 681 (2006) (“[T]he CRC is 
essentially a toothless agreement with no formal enforcement mechanisms on 
participating states.”). 
80 See BUCK, supra note 31, at 49–51 (describing legal framework for the 
reporting process); DILLON, supra note 15, at 6 (discussing implementation 
mechanisms for UNCRC).  At most, the Committee can ask.  In fact, the 
Committee has in recent years discouraged countries from facilitating inter-
country adoptions.  See Elizabeth Bartholet, “Bartholet’s Position” in The Debate, 
supra note 37, at 234–35. 
81 CRC supra note 16, at art. 45(d).  The Committee can ask for a study of any 
particular areas of concern by the U.N. Secretary-General, CRC Art. 45(c), but the 
Secretary-General would have no authority to take any coercive action based on 
perceived CRC violations. 
82 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of State, Guatemala, INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION: BUREAU OF 
CONSULAR AFFAIRS (March 2013), http://adoption.state.gov/country_ 
information/country_specific_info.php?country-select=guatemala (stating that 
Guatemala’s adoption system is not in compliance with the Hague Convention 
and, as such, no new adoptions are permitted from that country). 
83 See Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/3/Rev.6, R. 66, 72, 78, 90 (Apr. 24, 2001) [hereinafter ROP] (authorizing 
complaints to be submitted by a representative of the victim of a human rights 
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condemnatory decisions and orders against countries it finds to 
have violated rights.84  The greatest procedural obstacle to bringing 
a complaint before the HRC would appear to be the ICCPR 
requirement of exhausting domestic remedies,85 but a child 
advocacy organization with sufficient resources might have the 
will and wherewithal for a preliminary navigation of the sending 
country’s administrative and judicial systems.86 
Finally, invoking the rights of children to leave any country 
and to change their nationality could trigger a profound attitudinal 
shift in the global community in a direction favorable to children.  
Such a claim would be jarring to the international adoption 
community, the international children’s rights community, and 
individual nations.  It might disturb entrenched views among 
politically-driven bodies who now claim a monopoly on the 
authoritative interpretation of children’s rights, such as UNICEF, 
and the U.N. Children’s Rights Committee.  Demoting the special-
rights conventions in the policy framework of nations and 
international organizations should also serve children by 
                                                     
violation “when it appears that the individual in question is unable to submit the 
communication personally,” which would certainly be true of babies, infants, and 
young children); ICCPR supra note 57, at art. 40–41 (requiring countries to submit 
reports on the progress of the expansion of civil and political rights); Status of 
Participant Countries to the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights,  UN TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/View 
Details.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-5&chapter=4&lang=en (listing 114 state 
parties to the Optional Protocol, including many actual and potential large 
sending countries).  The United States is not a party to the Optional Protocol, but 
that is irrelevant to the susceptibility of a sending country to complaint before the 
HRC, even if initiated by U.S. citizens, so long as the complaint is filed in a 
representative capacity on behalf of children who are citizens of the country being 
charged and that country is a party to the Optional Protocol. 
84 See discussion of cases infra, Part IV. 
85 See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights art. 2, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 (“Individuals who claim that any of 
their rights enumerated in the Covenant have been violated and who have 
exhausted all available domestic remedies may submit a written communication 
to the Committee for consideration.”).  
86 Some parents who were on the brink of taking children home from 
Russia—children with whom they already established a relationship when that 
country imposed a ban on American adoptions—filed complaints with the 
European Court of Human Rights.  See Sergei L. Loiko & Kim Murphy, Russian 
Adoption Ban Leaves U.S. Families in an Agonizing Limbo, L.A. TIMES (May 21, 2013), 
available at www.latimes.com/la-fg-russian-adoptions-20130521-dto,0,395498.html 
(revealing how some families have tried filing complaints with the Court).  Cf. 
Herszenhorn & Eckholm, supra note 12 (“[T]he relationship between parents and 
children begins long before the children leave the orphanage.”). 
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reminding everyone that children are not an inferior species 
begging for charity, nor any nation’s possessions, but rather equal 
persons with the same moral claims that adults have to be free to 
pursue available opportunities for their betterment, 
uncompromised by others’ self-serving agendas.  Tapping into 
universal human rights in this context should also inspire those 
working on other child welfare issues at the international level to 
consider always what additional and potentially more effective 
legal avenues might be open to them in general human rights 
documents.  There could be a wholesale reorientation of 
international children’s rights practice and scholarship.  The lesson 
could also extend to advocacy for other vulnerable populations 
that might be disserved by group-specific conventions. 
In sum, there are numerous reasons why proponents of 
international adoption should break free from the special-rights 
framework that now dominates discourse and diplomacy, and 
should begin invoking more general human rights laws:  1) those 
laws contain a more explicit and direct normative basis for such 
advocacy—in particular, the right to leave any country and the 
right to change one’s nationality; 2) they clearly impose the burden 
of proof on sending nations to justify any restrictions on 
international adoption, rather than forcing proponents of 
international adoption to persuade such nations that lifting 
restrictions is the more humane thing to do; 3) they confine the 
range of permissible justifications to a few enumerated ones; 4) 
invoking more general human rights incorporates precedents and 
scholarly work interpreting those rights in a variety of contexts 
involving persons in various categories, thus avoiding the sui 
generis reasoning about children and international adoption that 
often results in compromising children’s wellbeing; 5) thinking 
about the right to migration for the purpose of forming family 
relationships at a higher level of generality puts common empirical 
assertions about children’s needs and about the quality of life in 
particular countries in a different and more objective light; 6) 
whereas the enforcement mechanism for the CRC and the Hague 
Convention are quite weak, and in particular do not allow for 
individual complaints in international tribunals, the more general 
human rights laws do offer the opportunity for private 
enforcement action in relatively effective institutions; and 7) 
asserting universal human rights on behalf of children should 
trigger a healthy attitude correction in the international 
community. 
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3.4. Choice of Law 
The existence of both general-rights conventions and 
potentially conflicting special-rights conventions raises the 
question of which set is controlling.  Is it even possible, as a matter 
of international law, to invoke general human rights law on a topic 
that is the subject of one or more specialized conventions?  Does 
the specific trump the general, as one canon of statutory 
interpretation in American law provides for cases of conflicting 
statutes?87  In addition, because the CRC and the Hague 
Convention both came later in time than the more general 
conventions mentioned above, we must ask whether the later in 
time trumps or displaces the earlier.88 
The straightforward answer to these questions is that the CRC 
and the Hague Convention themselves disavow any displacement 
of general, fundamental human rights. The CRC, in Article 41, 
states: 
Nothing in the present Convention shall affect any 
provisions which are more conducive to the realization of 
the rights of the child and which may be contained in . . . 
(b) International law in force for that State. 
Article 1 of the Hague Convention sets forth as the first of the 
“objects of the present Convention” that party States will “ensure 
that intercountry adoptions take place in the best interests of the 
child and with respect for his or her fundamental rights as 
recognized in international law.”  Moreover, in both of these 
conventions, the language relied on by proponents of the DPP 
Principle actually does not speak of rights.  The language in Article 
21 of the CRC merely qualifies a command to party States that they 
consider international adoption.  The language in the preamble to 
the Hague Convention qualifies a merely empirical statement 
about the possible child-welfare benefits of international adoption, 
and the language in Article 4 about placement within the State of 
origin merely requires “due consideration.” 
Any rational decision maker would therefore be hard-pressed 
to conclude that either the CRC or the Hague Convention 
                                                     
87 See, e.g., Brown v. Commonwealth, 688 S.E. 2d 185, 192 (Va. 2010) 
(articulating the proposition that when two statutes dealing with the same subject 
matter are in conflict, the more specific prevails). 
88 Cf. State v. Harvey, 187 S.E. 2d 706, 717 (N.C. 1972). 
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supplants children’s fundamental rights to emigrate and change 
nationality or constricts those rights in any way.  Parties to those 
conventions agreed to respect all of children’s rights as previously 
set forth in international law in their decision making about 
intercountry adoption, and they did not purport to be 
withdrawing, diminishing, or reinterpreting children’s basic 
human right to leave their country of birth. 
In addition, the declarations and conventions containing the 
general rights pronouncements speak to whether and to what 
extent parties may derogate from their strictures.89  As noted 
above, the ICCPR authorizes derogation from the right of 
emigration in limited circumstances, and it further states: 
Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as 
implying for any State, group or person any right to engage 
in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction 
of any of the rights and freedoms recognized herein or at 
their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in 
the present Covenant.90 
Assuming that “any act” would include entry into a 
subsequent convention, becoming a party to the ICCPR entailed a 
commitment to refrain from signing on to any other convention, or 
from interpreting any other convention to which one is a party, in 
such a way that would authorize denial of the right to emigrate in 
any circumstances in which the ICCPR would not permit such 
denial.  This is consistent with the “Siracusa Principles,” a U.N. 
human rights sub-commission’s interpretation of the ICCPR’s 
derogation provision.91 The Principles provide that “state 
limitations must be in accordance with the law; based on a 
legitimate objective; strictly necessary in a democratic society; the 
least restrictive and intrusive means available; and not arbitrary, 
unreasonable, or discriminatory.”92  A party to the ICCPR would 
                                                     
89 I do not consider whether the jus cogens principle applies, as the terms of 
the ICCPR itself suggest the right to emigrate is not a peremptory norm of 
international law. 
90 ICCPR, supra note 57, at art. 5(1). 
91 See United Nations Economic and Social Council, The Siracusa Principles 
on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, annex, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/4 (Sept. 28, 1984) 
[hereinafter Siracusa Principles] (stating the United Nation’s position of 
derogation and limits on human rights). 
92 Gostin & Berkman, supra note 56, at 146. 
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also have to comply with its equal treatment stricture, and so 
would have to refrain from “any act” that withdraws an ICCPR 
right from some group on a discriminatory basis. 
Finally, even if later, more specific conventions did displace 
earlier, more general human rights conventions to some degree, 
that degree must be limited to what the language of the later 
conventions clearly compels.  Given the fundamental nature of the 
right to exit and the emphatic statements in the UDHR and the 
ICCPR as to their applicability to “everyone,” a conservative 
approach is required in interpreting any provisions of the CRC or 
the Hague Convention that could derogate from that right for 
children.  As explained above, the CRC and Hague Convention 
passages cited in support of the DPP Principle are quite vague and 
thus open to multiple interpretations, including interpretations 
that favor international adoption for any child for whom an 
equally good domestic adoption is not presently available.  Those 
latter interpretations are compelled by a properly conservative 
approach to applying the language, in light of the strong 
presumption in favor of a right to emigrate that the UDHR and 
ICCPR create. 
4. INTERPRETATIONS OF THE RIGHT TO EMIGRATE 
The right of emigration has not received a great deal of 
attention in legal proceedings, international diplomacy, or legal 
scholarship.  This lack of attention might be in part because 
denying adult citizens freedom to leave per se is uncommon.  As 
discussed below, nations do have reasons to prefer that particular 
people not leave their territory.  But they are more likely either to 
accept that they cannot prevent such persons from leaving or to 
hold such persons in a detention facility, rather than trying to 
prevent exit by denying a passport or refusing to let them board a 
plane or train, and in the latter case complaints are likely to rest on 
the right against unlawful detention.  Another likely part of the 
explanation is that a far greater restriction on freedom of 
international migration is the limit on immigration that most 
countries impose.  Immigration policies and state practices 
regarding refugees and asylum seekers receive enormous attention 
in public and scholarly discourse and in legal tribunals. 
It is possible, though, to discern some prevailing views about 
the permissibility of specific reasons for denying freedom to 
emigrate and about the general standards by which to judge any 
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specific restrictions.  Clues appear in the Siracusa Principles, in 
published decisions of international human rights tribunals and 
domestic courts, and in scholarly writing about the right to 
emigrate.  This Part reviews those sources of interpretation.  As an 
initial matter, though, it considers when the right should even 
come in to play for non-autonomous right holders who do not 
themselves decide that they want to emigrate. 
4.1. Non-autonomous Persons’ Right to Emigrate 
The ICCPR Rules of Procedure contemplate that a 
representative will assert rights on behalf of a right holder who “is 
unable to submit the communication personally.”93  The Rules 
thereby confirm that the “everyone” upon whom the Convention 
bestows civil rights is not limited to autonomous persons, but 
rather really means everyone.  The Convention and Rules say 
nothing further, however, about the circumstances in which 
someone may file a complaint on behalf of another person. 
Presumably the assumption was that it would happen when and 
only when that other person would have submitted the 
communication himself if able. 
To guard against random applications for relief on behalf of 
incompetent persons, the HRC should therefore require a prima 
facie showing by a purported representative that a) the right 
holder’s situation is such that he or she likely would assert a 
particular right against particular state action if able to do so, and 
b) the purported representative is an appropriate agent for the 
right holder.  The first requirement would call on the filer to 
present evidence that some state of affairs other than the status quo 
would be substantially better for the right holder and that it would 
be possible to secure that state of affairs but for the state action or 
policy alleged to violate a Convention right.  The second 
requirement might be satisfied with evidence that the 
representative is a responsible party genuinely concerned with the 
welfare of the right holder and without conflict of interests.94 
                                                     
93 ROP, supra note 83, at R. 90.  
94 Cf. S.P., D.P., & A.T. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 23715/94, 94 Eur. 
Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep 31 (1997) (approving petition on behalf of children that 
a lawyer filed on his own initiative, and stating that “[t]he Commission has 
examined whether other or more appropriate representation exists or is available, 
the nature of the links between Mr. Clements and the children, the object and 
scope of the application introduced on their behalf and whether there are any 
conflicts of interest”).  
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Because the country being charged with violating incompetent 
persons’ right to emigrate has control over those persons, over 
access to them, and over information about their situation, no more 
than a prima facie showing should be required to initiate an HRC 
proceeding. 
Thus, suppose some developing Country X were holding a 
great number of mentally disabled adults, abandoned by their 
families, in state-run institutional facilities of very poor quality. 
Suppose further that a private organization in highly-developed 
Country Y created a first-rate rehabilitative community for 
mentally disabled adults, one where patients lived in a family 
setting and received the best services and training known to 
mankind, and that it had plenty of room to welcome new residents. 
Suppose, finally, that the organization asked the proper authorities 
in Country X to permit a certain number of the mentally disabled 
adults there to emigrate to Country Y and enter into this facility, 
but Country X refused. Country X asserted concerns about the 
disabled adults’ welfare, but observers believe the real reason for 
the refusal is that leaders thought accepting the offer would 
wound national pride, implying that Country X was not properly 
caring for its dependent citizens.  If the organization then went to 
the HRC, and if it could make a prima facie showing of 1) the poor 
conditions in Country X’s facility; 2) the possibility for a much 
better life in Country Y; and 3) its own bona fides, then the HRC 
should accept a complaint submitted by the organization as 
representative for the disabled adults, alleging a violation of the 
right to emigrate.  For the rights of such adults to be at all 
meaningful, it must be possible for someone to assert their rights in 
their behalf, and their current legal custodian cannot be relied on to 
do so, because that custodian (the government of Country X) is the 
very party thought to be violating the individuals’ rights.  
Accepting the petition would not be the end of the matter, of 
course; the HRC would then invite Country X to proffer a defense 
of its actions. 
The same analysis should apply in the case of young children 
living in orphanages, other state facilities, or on streets in 
developing countries.95  Persons and organizations who can 
                                                     
95 Older would-be adoptees’ own expressed wishes might suffice to 
legitimate a complaint brought in their behalf by would-be adopters.  I bracket 
here questions that would arise if adolescents asserted a right to emigrate even 
outside the adoption context, perhaps to escape from parental custody.  When 
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demonstrate a genuine concern for their welfare should be able to 
act in a representative capacity for them, individually and/or as a 
class, and assert their right to leave the country to pursue available 
opportunities for a family life, education, and other basic goods. 
They should simply have to make a prima facie showing that 
current conditions and future prospects for the children are very 
poor in their country of origin, and that opportunities for a much 
better life are available to them elsewhere.  This showing would 
shift the burden, as explained below, onto the state to justify any 
obstacles it has created to the children’s migration. 
4.2.  Interpreting Bases for Restricting the Right 
The ICCPR specifies exclusive bases upon which it might be 
permissible to restrict any person’s right to leave his native 
country:  “those which are provided by law, are necessary to 
protect national security, public order (ordre public), public health 
or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent 
with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant.” 96  There 
is not a great deal of guidance on the meaning of key terms in this 
statement, but I collect here what exists. 
4.2.1. The Siracusa Principles 
In 1984, a group of NGOs sponsored an international 
conference bringing together many of the most respected experts 
on international and human rights law, at which the experts 
drafted interpretations of the limitation and derogation provisions 
of the ICCPR.  The resulting Siracusa Principles are widely viewed 
as authoritative.97  The Principles contain both general guidance for 
applying all exceptions to the Convention’s rights pronouncements 
and interpretations of each specific exception. 
                                                     
minors’ rights should change from interest-protecting to choice-protecting is a 
question that arises in numerous contexts.  Answering it is not necessary in order 
to analyze the interest-protecting rights of young children.  On the distinction 
between and justifications for these types of rights, see JAMES G. DWYER, THE 
RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN app. A (2006).  
96 ICCPR, supra note 57, at art. 12. 
97 See Daniel R. Mekonnen, Mandatory Premarital HIV Testing as a Challenge to 
Human Rights, 5 INTERDISC. J. HUM. RTS. L. 1, 7-8 (2010-11) (describing Siracusa 
Principles that permit limitations of human rights when there is legitimate public 
health concern). 
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4.2.1.1. General guidance 
The general guidance makes clear that exceptions to the 
Convention’s rights are disfavored: 
 “No limitations or grounds for applying them to rights 
guaranteed by the Covenant are permitted other than 
those contained in the terms of the Covenant itself.” 
 “All limitation clauses shall be interpreted strictly and 
in favour of the rights at issue.” 
 “In applying a limitation, a State shall use no more 
restrictive means than are required for the achievement 
of the purpose of the limitation.” 
 “Every limitation imposed shall be subject to the 
possibility of challenge to and remedy against its 
abusive application.” 98 
The general guidance imposes on the state the burden of 
demonstrating the need for any restriction, rather than putting on 
the individual the burden of proving that a restriction is 
unreasonable: 
 “The burden of justifying a limitation upon a right 
guaranteed under the Covenant lies with the State.” 
 “Any assessment as to the necessity of a limitation shall 
be made on objective considerations.” 99 
And the general guidance mandates that any restrictions be 
generally applicable rather than discriminatory: 
 “No limitation on a right recognized by the Covenant 
shall discriminate contrary to article 2, paragraph I 
[‘without distinction of any kind’].” 
 “No limitation on the exercise of human rights shall be 
made unless provided for by national law of general 
application . . .” 
 “No limitation shall be applied in an arbitrary 
manner.”100 
Under these general guiding principles, any nation must be 
susceptible to being called to account to the HRC for any restriction 
it imposes on children’s freedom to emigrate, including any 
obstacles to international adoption.  It must present objective 
evidence that the restriction is necessary to serve one of the few 
                                                     
98 Siracusa Principles, supra note 91. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
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exceptions that the Convention contains.  It must show that it 
cannot protect the state interest embodied in the exception without 
restricting the right to emigrate.  And it must apply the restriction 
evenhandedly to all citizens whenever doing so would serve that 
state interest, not just impose it on children arbitrarily. 
4.2.1.2. Guidance on specific exceptions 
Article 12 of the ICCPR recognizes just five possible bases upon 
which the right to emigrate might permissibly be restricted:  
national security, public order, public morals, public health, and 
the rights and freedoms of others.  The drafters originally 
considered and then rejected additional bases, such as control of 
migrant workers and “the general welfare.”101  As to each 
exception the Convention does allow, the Siracusa Principles 
provide interpretive guidance. 
Regarding national security, the Principles permit derogation 
only when necessary “to protect the existence of the nation, its 
territorial integrity or political independence against force or threat 
of force.”  That exception clearly does not authorize restrictions on 
international adoption. 
The Principles define “public order” to mean “the sum of rules 
which ensure the functioning of society or the set of fundamental 
principles on which society is founded.”  They qualify this by 
stating that public order necessarily entails respect for human 
rights, so a country signatory could not invoke “fundamental 
principles” that inherently entail denial of human rights to some 
people.  The Principles state further with respect to public order 
that the term “shall be interpreted in the context of the purpose of 
the particular human right which is limited on this ground.”  This 
guidance on the whole suggests that any state restricting the right 
of emigration would have to demonstrate, based on objective 
evidence, that doing so is necessary for the continued functioning 
of the society or to preserve fundamental, human-rights-respecting 
principles upon which the society is founded.102 
It is wholly implausible, and certainly not supportable by 
objective evidence, to suggest that any society would cease to 
function if a tiny percentage of its children emigrate; indeed 
                                                     
101 See Barist et al., supra note 67, at 388–89 (detailing the original restrictions 
found in the ICCPR).  
102 Cf. id. at 405 (stating that the ICCPR drafters substituted “public order” for 
“public safety,” on the assumption that the former was more restrictive). 
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emigration of orphaned children eases a burden on the society, and 
any threat emigration poses to a society would seem much greater 
in the case of able adults, particularly educated adults.  A 
fundamental principle that “the state owns the people born on its 
territory” would not be respectful of human rights, and it is 
difficult to imagine what other fundamental principle upon which 
a society is founded is threatened by emigration of unparented 
infants.  The social contract-related principle of “fair dealing,” 
under which members of a society have a duty to reciprocate for 
benefits they have received, might be a principle upon which any 
society is founded, but it is generally understood to apply only so 
long as one remains within the same society and clearly would 
apply with greater force to adults seeking to emigrate than to 
infants.103 
“Public morals” appears closely related to the idea of 
fundamental principles, and the Principles emphasize that with 
this potentially capacious grounds for exception the state must 
“demonstrate that the limitation in question is essential to the 
maintenance of respect for fundamental values of the 
community.”104  They also reiterate that, as with an exception on 
any other specified basis, any restriction justified in public morals 
terms must be applied in a non-discriminatory way, and so would 
have to extend to both adults and children.  As such, the points 
made above regarding public order would apply here as well. 
Public health is a more promising basis for justifying 
restrictions on international adoption.  The Principles state that it 
“may be invoked as a ground for limiting certain rights in order to 
allow a State to take measures dealing with a serious threat to the 
health of the population or individual members of the 
population.”105  Sending countries are certainly permitted to take 
measures aimed at protecting the health and safety of children who 
might be adopted.  And some nations have created obstacles to the 
emigration of adults avowedly on grounds of public health (in the 
case of quarantine) or individual safety (e.g., the Philippines’ 
prohibition on international marriage brokers, discussed below). 
But pursuant to the general guidelines presented above, no state 
may simply toss out the word “trafficking” and thereby justify 
                                                     
103 See John Rawls, Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play, in LAW AND 
PHILOSOPHY: A SYMPOSIUM 3 (Sidney Hook ed., 1964). 
104 Siracusa Principles, supra note 91.  
105 Id.  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
DWYER_1.13 (1) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/23/2014  2:52 PM 
232 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 35:1 
severe restrictions on, or prohibition of, international adoption, as 
can and does occur within the CRC framework.106  A complaint 
against such sending-countries’ policies before the HRC would 
force such a nation to present objective evidence that a) the danger 
to children is substantial, b) the state cannot address the danger by 
means short of denying the right to emigrate, c) the state applies 
the restriction no more broadly than is strictly necessary, and d) 
the state either applies the same restriction on emigration to adults 
who are in danger of trafficking or can rationally and convincingly 
explain the difference in the treatment of adults and children.107 
Finally, as to rights and freedoms of others, the Principles state 
that these may include rights and freedoms that do not arise from 
the ICCPR itself, but might instead derive from other sources.  
They qualify this, however, by saying the ICCPR itself is assumed 
“to protect the most fundamental rights and freedoms.” 108  The 
only other guidance is that a restriction on human rights “shall not 
be used to protect the State and its officials from public opinion or 
criticism.”109  This last point suggests that no state could defend 
restrictions on international adoption on the grounds that the 
practice embarrasses the state or its leaders or exposes them to 
criticism. 
A right of others that a country is more likely to invoke is that 
of birth parents to maintain a relationship with their children.110 
                                                     
106 See, e.g., Reservation of Argentina to Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://treaties.un.org/Pages 
/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg_no=IV-11&chapter=4&lang=en (stating that Argentina 
would not apply any of the CRC Article 21 paragraphs relating to international 
adoption, because “before they can be applied a strict mechanism must exist for 
the legal protection of children in matters of inter-country adoption, in order to 
prevent trafficking in and the sale of children”). 
107 Applying the non-discrimination principle is more complex in a context 
where the restriction is truly necessary to spare the right-holder from serious 
harm.  Presumably if a state could satisfy a), b) and c), representatives would not 
have brought the challenge in the first place, or they would withdraw their 
complaint after the state made its child welfare case.  Alternatively, the tribunal 
might dismiss on standing-type grounds a complaint that ultimately comes down 
to “you are protecting us but not others.”  On the other hand, the anti-
discrimination rule and principle always serves as a useful check against sloppy 
empiricism or legal analysis. 
108 Siracusa Principles, supra note 91.  
109 Id.   
110 Recognition of such a right is widespread, but not universal.  See HOWELL, 
supra note 18, at 50-51 (discussing certain African tribes).  For an argument on 
theoretical grounds against the belief that birth parents are entitled to be the legal 
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That right might justify obstacles to international adoption aimed 
at ensuring that no child ostensibly available for international 
adoption is actually wanted by his or her birth parents and has a 
substantial chance of being able safely to return to them within a 
reasonable period of time.111  Again, though, a complaint before the 
HRC would force a state to demonstrate a substantial empirical 
basis for this concern and that there is no way to address it except 
by the restrictions imposed, or in other words that the measures 
taken are the least restrictive way of addressing the concern.  A 
substantial-risk requirement arises from the general aversion to 
restrictions, from the state’s burden to prove necessity and 
compelling reason, and from the non-discrimination mandate, 
insofar as the HRC would undoubtedly impose a substantial-risk 
test in any situation involving adults, such as quarantine. 
In sum, then, judging simply from the text of the ICCPR and 
the Siracusa Principles, the permitted bases for restricting the right 
to emigrate that could plausibly apply to international adoption 
are just children’s safety and parents’ rights.  Invoking the ICCPR 
would force states to do something they currently appear to 
suppose they have no need to do—that is, present persuasive 
evidence of a sufficiently substantial problem and show that they 
cannot avoid the problem by policies that are less restrictive of 
international adoption.  A less restrictive policy would include one 
that applies to a smaller group of children, if the evidence suggests 
the danger of injury to children or deprivation of parental rights 
exists only for an identifiable subset of all children as to whom 
international adoption is sought (e.g., those for whom adoption is 
sought other than through an official agency or properly licensed 
intermediary).  Part 5 below addresses specific rationales for limits 
on inter-country adoption in more depth. 
4.2.2. Adjudication of Obstacles to Exit 
The U.N.’s Human Rights Committee adjudicates complaints 
about violations of the ICCPR.  It has issued just a dozen or so 
decisions on the right to leave one’s country.  Most involved a 
                                                     
parents of their offspring regardless of whether this is in the children’s best 
interests, see DWYER, supra note 95.  
111 Cf. Maryl Sattler, The Problem of Parental Relocation: Closing the Loophole in 
the Law of International Child Abduction, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1709 (2010) 
(discussing the tests U.S. courts have applied to determine whether one parent 
may relocate internationally over the objection of the other parent). 
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country’s denying a passport to a national living at home or abroad 
and then incurring a charge of violating ICCPR Article 12 because 
absence of a passport inhibits international travel.  The HRC found 
a violation and upheld the complaint in all but one case in which 
the charged nation had in fact inhibited its national from moving 
across national borders.112  The typical apparent government 
motivation is political retribution against critics of the regime in 
power, and usually the native country does not even try to defend 
its actions.113  In none of its decisions did the Committee even 
entertain the idea that political opposition or published criticism of 
government could constitute a threat to national security, public 
order, or any other legitimate concern of the state. 
The one decision that upheld a passport denial involved an 
adult citizen of Finland who had failed to report for compulsory 
                                                     
112 See González del Río v. Peru, U.N. Rep. of the Human Rights Comm. 17-
21, Nov. 1, 1993, U.N. Doc. A/48/40 (Part II) (stating that Peru restricted freedom 
of movement by leaving an arrest warrant pending for seven years); Mabel 
Pereira Montero v. Uruguay, Communication No. 106/1981, UN Doc. Supp. No. 
40 (A/38/40), at 186 (1983) (describing a violation when Uruguay failed to renew 
a passport without justification); Samuel Lichtensztejn v. Uruguay, 
Communication No. 77/1980, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/38/40), at 166 (1983) 
(holding that a citizen of Uruguay living in Mexico was improperly denied a 
passport without justification); Carlos Varela Nunez v. Uruguay, Communication 
No. 108/1981, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/38/40), at 225 (1983) (finding that 
Uruguay improperly revoked the passport of a journalist living in the United 
States); Sophie Vidal Martins v. Uruguay, U.N. Rep. of the Human Rights 
Committee 157-60, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 40, U.N. Doc. A/37/40 
(Sept. 22, 1982), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs 
/session37/13-57.htm (holding that a Uruguayan national living in Mexico was 
improperly denied a passport renewal). In one decision, the Committee found 
that the complainant was not actually denied a passport nor inhibited in his 
travels.  Essono Mika Miha v. Equatorial Guinea, Communication No. 414/1990, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/414/1990 (1994). 
113 See, e.g., Oló Bahamonde v. Equatorial Guinea, 2 Report of the Human 
Rights Committee 183-88, P9.3, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 40, U.N. Doc. 
A/49/40 (Sept. 21, 1994), available at http://tb.ohchr.org/default.aspx? 
ConvType=12&docType=36 (indicating that the accused nation denied factual 
allegations rather than trying to defend denial of passport and detention); 
Lichtensztejn, supra note 112 (noting that the state did not respond to charges 
lodged by critic of Uruguayan government who was denied a passport); Vidal 
Martins, supra note 112 (noting that no justification was offered for denying 
passport to journalist). In some of these cases, the offending nation had gone 
beyond denying a passport to arresting and incarcerating political opponents or 
critics.  See, e.g., Chiiko Bwalya v. Zambia, Communication No. 314/1988, ¶ 6.6, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/48/D/314/1988 (1993) (stating that the leader of opposition 
party had been jailed); Nqalula Mpandanjila et al. v. Zaire, Communication No. 
138/1983, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/41/40), at 121 (1986) (detailing the 
detention of citizens after a critical open letter to the government). 
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military service when called.114  The Committee noted agreement 
by the Convention state parties, as reflected in the travaux 
preparatoires, “that the right to leave the country could not be 
claimed . . . in order to avoid such obligations as national 
service.”115  It concluded that enforcing the nation’s military service 
rules, by denying a passport if necessary to produce compliance, 
was “necessary for the protection of national security and public 
order,” was non-discriminatory, and did not infringe any other 
rights under the Covenant.116   Presumably, the HRC would not 
find in the case of unparented babies and infants that states may 
justify holding them captive until adulthood by pointing to the 
expectation that they will one day serve in the military or 
otherwise fulfill some obligation to the state.  A duty of military 
service arises, if at all, only for those who have reached adulthood 
after enjoying a nation’s public benefits throughout their 
upbringing. 
In one other case of special significance, the HRC found that 
Peru had violated a citizen’s ICCPR right to emigrate by delaying 
for too long legal action prerequisite to his departure.  The 
government had issued an arrest warrant against the man but then 
never arrested him and instead refused him permission to leave 
the country for the next seven years, citing the outstanding warrant 
for his arrest as the reason.  The Committee stated: 
Pursuant to paragraph 3 of article 12, the right to leave any 
country may be restricted, primarily, on grounds of 
national security and public order (ordre public).  The 
Committee considers that pending judicial proceedings 
may justify restrictions on an individual’s right to leave his 
country.  But where the judicial proceedings are unduly 
delayed, a constraint upon the right to leave the country is 
thus not justified . . . . The Committee considers that this 
situation violates the author’s rights under article 12, 
paragraph 2 . . . .117 
                                                     
114 Peltonen v. Finland, 2 U.N. Rep. of the Human Rights Committee 238-43, 
PP2.1, ¶ 8.4, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 40, U.N. Doc. A/49/40 (Sept. 21, 
1994) (holding that there was no violation in denying the passport for failure to 
participate in military service). 
115 Id. ¶ 8.3. 
116 Id. ¶ 8.4. 
117 del Río v. Peru, supra note 112, ¶ 5.3. 
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An advocate for a child for whom the adoption process is 
unduly prolonged might cite this case as precedent for the broader 
principle that unjustified delay in legal or administrative 
proceedings can constitute a violation of Article 12, even if a 
government purports to be permitting international adoptions.  
This passage, like that in other decisions of the Committee, 
reaffirms that exceptions to the right to emigrate are extremely 
limited, and that the burden is on the state to demonstrate that an 
enumerated exception applies.118 
4.2.3. Scholarly Writing 
The right to emigrate has also received little attention from 
scholars.  It is generally taken as a given, rather than analyzed in 
any depth, that denying any adults the freedom to emigrate 
patently violates their human rights, absent certain sorts of 
compelling circumstances.  Scholars have accepted as sufficiently 
compelling a real threat of spreading deadly disease, but endorse 
quarantine only with due process protection against unnecessary 
denial of freedom.119  On the other hand, scholars have rejected as 
bases for denying the right to emigrate resource-type concerns, 
such as labor shortage120 or loss of the most well-educated or 
talented citizens (i.e., “brain drain” and “muscle drain”).  Thus, in 
assessing how poor countries can respond to the “talent-for-
citizenship exchange” that robs them of the payoff for investing in 
development of their star athletes come Olympics time, Ayalet 
Shachar writes: 
Her home country may plead with her to stay or make 
promises to further invest in her development as an athlete, 
but as a cold legal matter, it cannot force her to stay.  
International law declarations and many domestic 
constitutions pronounce that individuals have a basic right 
to leave their country.121 
                                                     
118 See also Bwalya, supra note 113, ¶ 2.5 (discussing the case of a political 
activist declared a danger to national security, prompting restriction). 
119 See, e.g., Gregory P. Campbell, Global H1N1 Pandemic, Quarantine Law, and 
the Due Process Conflict, 12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 497, 516-18 (2011) (stating that the 
IHR permits quarantine in the case of serious health risks). 
120 See, e.g., Huling, supra note 61, at 659 (discussing UDHR rules that protect 
individual rights by not allowing employers to keep workers’ passports). 
121 Ayelet Shachar, Picking Winners: Olympic Citizenship and the Global Race for 
Talent, 120 YALE L.J. 2088, 2126 (2011).  Cf. Oberman, supra note 62 (considering 
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What goes without saying is the insufficiency in the case of 
adults of certain reasons a country might have for blocking 
emigration such as protecting national pride, resisting neo-
colonialism, hoping it will induce other nations to give more aid, 
concern that adult émigrés are being commodified, or preserving 
family-formation opportunities for those who remain in the 
country.  There is, implicitly, regarding adults, complete rejection 
today of the notion that states own their citizens and are 
empowered to limit their freedom to serve aims of the state or 
interests of other persons.122 
5. APPLYING THE RIGHT TO EMIGRATE TO INTER-COUNTRY 
ADOPTION 
This final Part examines, in light of the guidance just rehearsed, 
common explanations or justifications for countries’ imposing 
restrictions on international adoption.  The analysis will show that 
appeal to general human rights simplifies the international 
adoption issue somewhat, by ruling out certain kinds of 
considerations.  The issue remains complex, however, so the 
analysis here is meant to be preliminary, intended to begin a 
conversation within a new, general-human-rights normative 
framework. I do not attempt an exhaustive analysis of restrictions 
on international adoption.  My aims in this Article are to argue for 
a new analytical and advocacy framework, as I have done in Parts 
1 to 3; to identify principles that should guide application of the 
relevant general rights, as I have done in Part 4; and, in this Part, to 
demonstrate how this new framework changes the status and 
plausibility of common justifications for restrictions on 
international adoption.  I will ask as to each potential justification 
whether the international community would accept it as sufficient 
to block the emigration of any adults, and in particular any adults 
                                                     
only immigration restrictions by receiving states as an ethical state response to 
brain drain, but noting parenthetically that sending countries might be justified in 
restricting emigration in very limited circumstances, such as when the person 
seeking to emigrate clearly owes a duty to the native country to repay benefits 
received, like state-provided education). 
122 Cf. Ruth Rubio-Marín, Transnational Politics and the Democratic Nation-State: 
Normative Challenges of Expatriate Voting and Nationality Retention of Emigrants, 81 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 117, 122 (2006) (“Today . . . the prevailing liberal ethos includes the 
subject’s rights to leave the country and change nationality at least as long as there 
is another country willing to take the subject . . . . [T]he general attitude towards 
those who have left is disinterest . . . .”). 
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seeking to emigrate for purposes of family formation.  I begin the 
analysis with reasons having to do with supposed interests of the 
state, follow this with concerns about the rights or interests of 
persons other than the children who could be adopted, and end 
with justifications ostensibly resting on the children’s welfare. 
5.1. State Interests 
5.1.1. National Pride 
Russian President Putin gave indication that his support for the 
ban on American adoption of Russian-born children arose from his 
view that the practice is demeaning for Russia.123  South Korea has 
in recent years imposed a strong domestic placement preference, 
even though domestic adoption opportunities fall far short of need, 
in part because government leaders think it reflects poorly on the 
nation that native children must leave the country to find a 
home.124  Many observers of international adoption perceive this 
ego-protecting motivation as the dominant one behind imposition 
of restrictions in other countries as well.125 
This motivation falls into the category of patently illicit under 
the ICCPR right of emigration.  It is clearly not within any of the 
ICCPR’s enumerated bases for derogation.  No country would 
attempt to justify refusing to allow women to leave for marriage 
purposes by asserting that their doing so constitutes an insult to 
the nation, even though that would seem even truer in the case of 
adult emigration.  There is no shortage of potential husbands for 
women in the former Soviet Union, so the desire of hundreds of 
thousands of Russian women to find a husband abroad reflects 
                                                     
123 See Herszenhorn & Eckholm, supra note 12 (“’There are probably many 
places in the world where living standards are better than ours,‘ Mr. Putin said. 
’So what? Shall we send all children there, or move there ourselves?’”). 
124 See Donald Kirk, South Korea Tries to Recall a U.S. Adoption, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Jan. 23, 2013, www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2013 
/0123/South-Korea-tries-to-recall-a-US-adoption (discussing Korea’s motivations 
in opposing adoption by foreign couples because of shame in inability to place its 
children nationally). 
125 See, e.g., HOWELL, supra note 18, at 161, 171; John Triseliotis, ”Inter-country 
Adoption: In Whose Best Interest?,” in INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION: PRACTICAL 
EXPERIENCES, supra note 35, 131 (stating that many in the Third World view inter-
country adoptions as “confirming their inferiority and inadequacy”); Bartholet, 
supra note 36, at 374–75; Bartholet, supra note 4, at 4 (discussing China, the African 
Child Policy Forum, and the condemnation of international adoptions for reasons 
of national pride).  
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poorly on Russian men and on former Soviet states as nations, yet 
these states must permit the women to leave.  Analogously, if a 
man forcibly holds his girlfriend captive because her departure to 
pursue better marriage prospects would wound his pride, his 
conduct is abuse, pure and simple, not commendable or even 
tolerable.  Holding children hostage to protect national pride is no 
less a form of human abuse. 
5.1.2. Neo-Colonialism 
Some intercountry adoption critics complain that the practice is 
imperialistic.126  Shani King writes:  “Little attention is paid in legal 
scholarship . . . to the argument that industrialized countries are 
exploiting developing countries and stealing their national 
resources, i.e., their healthy children.”127  Leaders of some third 
world countries have explained decisions to restrict or prohibit the 
practice in terms of protest against this modern-day form of 
exploitation and resource stealing.128  John Triseliotis reports that, 
for many in developing countries, inter-country adoptions 
“epitomize the exercise of influence and control by the more 
powerful nations who are seen as ‘robbing’ Third World countries 
of their children.”129  Extremists characterize it as genocide, 
                                                     
126 See, e.g., Kathleen Ja Sook Bergquist, International Asian Adoption: In the 
Best Interests of the Child?, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 343, 349 (2004) (characterizing 
international adoption of children by wealthier countries’ citizens as colonialist 
acquisition of national resources); Ryiah Lilith, Buying a Wife But Saving a Child: A 
Deconstruction of Popular Rhetoric and Legal Analysis of Mail-Order Brides and 
Intercountry Adoption, 9 BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 225, 229 (2000-2001) (purporting to 
reveal the “imperialism and commodification underlying intercountry 
adoptions”). 
127 King, supra note 2, at 436.  See also id. at 414 (tying intercountry adoption to 
“our imperialist orientation toward the world”). 
128 See, e.g., Triseliotis, supra note 125, at 131 (linking adoption to a sense of 
self-righteousness); Yngvesson, supra note 19, at 216-17 (citing authorities in 
developing countries who refer to children as a nation’s resources).  See also King, 
supra note 2, at 434-35 (providing other sources that document a concern about the 
appearance of imperialism motivating international agencies and national 
governments to adopt positions hostile to international adoption). 
129 Triseliotis, supra note 125, at 131 (explaining intercountry adoption in 
terms of a need to “rescue” children).  See also Hearst, supra note 1, at 333 
(discussing view by some critics of transnational adoption that such practice is a 
global market for human beings). 
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destroying communities and cultures by removing the next 
generation.130 
Those leveling a neo-colonialism charge uniformly fail to 
explain how an exploitation charge could apply to countries or 
regions with a severe over-population problem and in 
circumstances where the conditions in which children live produce 
very bad outcomes for them and, in turn, for their society.  None 
have offered any evidence that any sending countries or cultural 
communities have suffered from the departure of children from 
orphanages.  On the contrary, there is ample evidence that sending 
countries benefit economically from international adoption, 
because it reduces their costs of caring for unparented children, 
injects foreign currency through adopters’ travel expenses and fees 
paid to local agencies, and triggers voluntary contributions and 
purchases of local products by adopting parents and adopted 
children.131  Ultimately, the imperialism charge collapses into 
assertion of national pride, dismissed above. 
Moreover, the strategy of appealing to more general rights held 
by all, and demanding justifications that would apply to all, makes 
evident that this charge is also simply inapt and insufficient even if 
there were any empirical basis for it.  A neo-colonial exploitation 
charge would be more plausible in regard to the practice of 
international marriage, that is, a charge that the practice principally 
consists of western men extracting a valuable “resource” (i.e., 
women) from poor countries.132  Though a nation might well suffer 
from the mass departure of its healthy, educated women, 
especially a nation like China experiencing a serious shortfall of 
                                                     
130 Hearst, supra note 1, at 330 (“[M]any groups view the placement of 
children outside of their boundaries as tantamount to genocide.”). 
131  See HOWELL, supra note 18, at 182 (discussing fiscal burdens and benefits 
of adoption); Barbara Stark, Baby Girls From China in New York: A Thrice-Told Tale, 
2003 UTAH L. REV. 1231, 1270 (2003) (pointing out that roughly a billion dollars 
goes each year from the U.S. to China as a result of adoptive parents buying 
cultural items to give to their adopted children); Cost to Adopt from China, 
FAMLILIES THRU INTERNATIONAL ADOPTION (Sept. 17, 2013, 9:00 PM), 
http://www.ftia.org/china/costs.asp (advising prospective adopters that they 
will need to make a “donation” of over $5,000 to their child’s orphanage and pay 
over $2,000 to Chinese officials, and that an adopting couple can expect to spend 
nearly $5,000 on living and traveling expenses while in China). 
132  See Lilith, supra note 126, at 228-29 (maintaining that it is actually more 
common for the mail-order bride phenomenon to be viewed as exploitative neo-
colonialism). 
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marriageable women,133 no one suggests that this is a reason to 
curtail the right of women to emigrate.  Likewise, many people 
complain that “talent drain” harms poor countries, and some 
characterize it as neo-colonialist exploitation,134 yet no one 
launches an argument on this basis per se for denying the highly-
educated and talented a right of emigration.  Scholars take as given 
that poor countries would violate human rights by trying to hold 
their adult talent pool captive, absent a legitimate contractual 
obligation that locally-trained adults owe to their country.  It 
would smack of commodifying and enslaving human beings.  
Within the general rights framework, supporters of international 
adoption can persuasively argue that it is no justification for 
violating any persons’ right to emigrate that a country views them 
as a valuable national or cultural-community resource.  If it is not a 
justification in the case of adults, in whom a country is more likely 
already to have invested substantially, then it cannot be in the case 
of children. 
5.2. Other Persons in Sending Countries 
5.2.1. Children Left Behind 
Related to the charge of exploitation is the complaint that 
international adoption changes the lives of only a tiny percentage 
of all needy children in sending countries, and not necessarily the 
very neediest, while doing nothing to help the children who are 
not adopted or the country more generally.135  In fact, some suggest 
                                                     
133 See Simon Rabinovitch, China Takes Baby Steps in Narrowing Gender 
Imbalance, REUTERS (June 3, 2010, 9:00 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2010/06/03/us-china-sex-imbalance-idUSTRE65236520100603 (“More than 24 
million Chinese men of marrying age could find themselves without spouses in 
2020 . . . .”).  Significantly, although China has a serious gender imbalance in its 
population, the market for Internet brides from China is thriving.  A Google 
search for “Chinese brides” yields countless marriage broker sites, such as 
ChnLove.com, ChineseLoveLinks.com, and ChineseWomenDating.com.   
134 See Shachar, supra note 121, at 2129 (discussing professional soccer 
leagues’ recruitment of young players). 
135 See, e.g., Hearst, supra note 1, at 333 (alleging that transnational adoption 
harms efforts to improve support for local community based projects); Bergquist, 
supra note 126, at 349-50 (“[I]nternational adoption at best does not address 
precipitating social conditions, providing instead a short term and arguably 
minimal impact on the problem of homelessness and poverty for children.  At 
worst, it allows countries to abdicate responsibility for enacting sociopolitical 
change to secure the well-being of all children . . . .”); King, supra note 2, at 425, 
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it “retards the growth of infrastructure within countries that could 
care for children in-country.”136 
This complaint overlooks the just-mentioned ways in which 
international adoption does actually help those who remain in the 
sending country, in particular by lessening the number of children 
in state custody, thereby freeing up more of the sending country’s 
resources for spending on support for parents and other family-
preserving measures, and by triggering substantial infusion of 
foreign currency from adopters.  In addition, this complaint suffers 
from implicitly suggesting that children who could leave should be 
kept hostage, to try to induce those who care about the suffering in 
poor countries to take action aimed at improving conditions in the 
sending country.  The imagined causal chain of events from closing 
off adoption to greater foreign investment is difficult to draw, but 
even if it were clearer, this strategy would be morally indefensible 
and unsupported by any ICCPR exception.  That becomes evident 
when we, again, situate adoption within the broader context of 
emigration.  It could equally be said of a prohibition on any adults 
leaving a country that it might inspire other nations or wealthy 
individuals in other nations to provide aid to that country.  But 
even if this speculation were the least bit realistic, no one would 
maintain that this is a valid and sufficient reason for a country’s 
infringing adults’ rights to leave their native country and change 
their nationality.  Likewise, no one would contend that adults 
should be denied freedom to exit for marriage purposes because 
the best leave and the most unfortunate remain behind.  It should 
be no more plausible to contend that a country should shut down 
foreign adoption because most adopters seek healthy infants and 
pass over special needs and older children. 
                                                     
428, 461 (complaining that international adoption fails to address some 
overarching issues for disadvantaged children). 
136 King, supra note 2, at 465 (suggesting that mandatory donations to 
countries could help assuage critics of international adoption).  See also Triseliotis, 
supra note 125, at 132.  David Smolin maintains that open inter-country adoption 
policies hurt older and special-needs children in orphanages because they are 
passed over in favor of healthy infants.  Smolin, supra note 72, at 242-43.  He does 
not explain, however, how restrictions on international adoption help older or 
special-needs children get adopted.  To the extent they result in raising the 
average age of adopted children, it would seem they do so only by forcing 
unparented children to wait longer to join an adoptive family.   Smolin also 
asserts that inter-country adoption is almost always bad for older children, 
because it is so disorienting.  Id. at 238–39, 240. 
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Some propose, as a way of addressing the supposed harm that 
international adoption inflicts on poor countries, that adopters and 
western governments pay a hefty tax for each international 
adoption, which sending countries would in theory use to improve 
family-preservation and domestic adoption efforts.137  Most 
sending countries in effect already do this; the size of fees paid to 
state agencies and orphanages undoubtedly far exceeds any costs 
the sending country incurs in processing an adoption.  Moreover, 
those who propose an adoption tax do not consider whether 
increasing the cost in this way would lower demand and therefore 
produce no net gain to the sending country and a profound loss for 
children who as a result are never adopted.  They implicitly 
assume that westerners wishing to adopt have unlimited money to 
spend and that demand is inelastic, but we know that the current 
high cost already deters many people.138 
In addition, generalizing again makes the proposal 
unpalatable:  would those who support an adoption tax also 
support an international marriage tax, by which countries that 
‘supply’ brides for western men tax those men and/or their 
government, perhaps to fund employment for potential domestic 
husbands?  There is in fact one example of a country imposing a 
tax on brides; Turkmenistan for some years required foreign men 
wanting to marry one of its women to pay a $50,000 fee, ostensibly 
as a demonstration of sincerity that would help prevent trafficking.  
Human rights organizations condemned the fee as a violation of 
women’s human rights, and in 2005 the country eliminated it.139  
Such a tax commodifies people, suggests that nations have some 
proprietary interest in the humans that live within their borders for 
which they must be compensated, and unjustifiably infringes 
individuals’ right to exit the country in order to pursue a better life.  
The proposal to tax inter-country adoption does all of these things 
with respect to children.  It is another illustration of how sui generis 
thinking about children, encouraged by special-rights enactments, 
                                                     
137 See, e.g., King, supra note 2, at 464-65 (stating that some states currently 
require donations be made to orphanages from which children are adopted). 
138 See Rachel J. Wechsler, Giving Every Child a Chance: The Need for Reform and 
Infrastructure in Intercountry Adoption Policy, 22 PACE INT’L L. REV. 1, 30 (2010) 
(explaining that costs for international adoption are prohibitively high for some 
couples).  
139 See generally Gulnoza Saidazimova, Turkmenistan: Marriage Gets Cheaper As 
Turkmenbashi Drops $50,000 Dollar Foreigners’ Fee, RADIO FREE EUROPE (Jan. 10, 
2005, 10:00 PM), http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1059210.html. 
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leads to policies and ways of thinking no one would apply to 
adults. 
5.2.2. Profiteering 
Russia’s ombudsman for children has defended that country’s 
ban on adoption by Americans in part by charging that 
international adoptions are driven by adoption agencies’ desire to 
make money, citing the fees that range between $30,000 and 
$50,000 that adopting parents typically pay.140  It is unclear whom 
this harms, other than adoptive parents who pay the fees and 
children who remain unparented because the high cost of adoption 
deters other would-be adopters.  It is also unclear how those high 
fees could drive demand, which ultimately must come from 
would-be parents, rather than deterring it.141  There are well-
documented reasons why westerners seek to adopt from other 
countries, and they do not include wanting to pay a lot of money 
or falling under the spell of adoption agency advertising. 
Apart from the illogic of this objection, it simply would not 
stand up upon being generalized to cover formation across 
national borders of family bonds more generally.  The proliferation 
of international dating Internet sites suggests there is much money 
to be made by charging fees to American and European men to 
meet online and communicate with women in former Soviet 
countries, Asia, and Latin America.142  Yet no country has enacted 
legislation to ban marriage of its citizens to Americans or deny the 
right to emigrate for marriage purposes, on the ground that these 
                                                     
140 See generally Herszenhorn, supra note 12 (discussing Russian official’s 
suggestion that international adoptions are driven by profit motives).  Cf. D. 
Marianne Blair, Safeguarding the Interests of Children in Intercountry Adoption: 
Assessing the Gatekeepers, 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 349, 352 (2005-2006) (“Prior to the 
1990s, most international adoption agencies were philanthropic or missionary 
organizations.  During the past twenty years, however, the number of 
international adoption agencies in the United States has more than doubled, and 
many facilitators are now private or for-profit companies and individual 
entrepreneurs.”). 
141 Others maintain that both birth parents and adopted parents are exploited 
by the public and private agencies that control international adoption.  See, e.g., 
Peter Selman, Adoption: A Cure for (too) Many Ills, in CROSS-CULTURAL APPROACHES 
TO ADOPTION, supra note 2, at 270 (stressing the need for regulation of intercountry 
adoption and higher ethical standards). 
142 See Jane Kim, Trafficked: Domestic Violence, Exploitation in Marriage, and the 
Foreign-Bride Industry, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 443, 469 (2011) (stressing the size of the 
international dating website market and its costs). 
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marriage agencies are driven by profit motives.  The presence of 
market incentives for agencies to facilitate international family 
formation in and of itself provides no justification for infringing 
the right to emigrate. 
5.2.3. Coercion of Parents 
The more legitimate concern relating to money is that some 
parents are induced to relinquish their children to adoption 
intermediaries or agencies by proffered payments.143  This was 
among the concerns that motivated creation of the Hague 
Convention.144  There is debate about how substantial this concern 
is today.  Proponents of international adoption contend that the 
concern rests on rumors or illogical extrapolation from a small 
number of documented cases, and that with millions of children 
already in orphanages or living on the streets because their parents 
died or abandoned them there is little incentive for anyone to buy 
or kidnap a child.145  Rather than wade into this empirical debate, I 
want to make some different points. 
First, even if this is a prevalent practice, it could be viewed as 
parents exercising their rights rather than having them denied.  
There is some tension between treating monetary inducement as a 
basis for blocking adoptions and the standard assumption, which 
provides the primary normative foundation for conferral of 
parental rights, that parents know what is best for their children 
and try always to do what is best for them.  It entails some suspect 
second-guessing of parents’ difficult decisions to relinquish their 
                                                     
143 See Blair, supra note 140, at 355-65 (describing the practice of an adoption 
agency in Cambodia to induce parents to relinquish their babies by offering $50 
and false promises of continuing contact). 
144 See HOWELL, supra note 18, at 178-79, 218 (explaining that financial 
practices relating to adoptions in Guatemala, Romania, and elsewhere played a 
role in development of the Hague Convention).  See also Wardle, supra note 44, at 
122-23 (discussing influences on the Hague Convention, including questionable 
adoption methods in Romania).  
145 See, e.g., Bartholet, supra note 5, at 96 (contending that preventing 
adoptions because of a small number of abuses is detrimental to children); 
Wardle, supra note 44, at 144 (“Establishing safeguards and procedures for 
stopping abuses existing in a small-but-sensational minority of international 
adoptions are explicit objectives of the HCIA; one way to achieve those objectives 
is to significantly reduce international adoptions, slowing them to a trickle of 
exactingly screened, perfectly comfortable adoptions.”).  See also Jini L. Roby & 
Stacey A Shaw, The African Orphan Crisis and International Adoption, 51 SOCIAL 
WORK 199, 200 (2006) (“[T]here are no documented cases of adoption trafficking 
into the United States from Africa.”). 
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newborn or infant child, which might in fact be the best thing for 
that child and the rest of the family.  This phenomenon is likely to 
occur precisely in places where existence is truly marginal, where 
parents fear for their children’s survival.  Some parents and older 
children in those countries might wonder how it is that they are 
better off as a result of their ‘protectors’ imposing cumbersome 
procedures designed to ensure that parents do not receive any 
money in the process of separating from their youngest 
offspring.146 
Many would say this means the circumstances should change, 
so that no parents would feel compelled for the good of their 
family to “sell” their children.147  Instead of adopting children from 
a desperately poor nation, we in the West should pour aid money 
into the country to ensure that every family there can live a secure 
existence in a normal home environment.  This response suffers 
from what I call the “Better World Fallacy,” the reasoning that if a 
certain government policy (which could be, e.g., imprisoning 
people for dealing drugs, removing children from abusive parents, 
or any other law enforcement reaction to the dysfunctional 
behavior that poverty and injustice produce) would be 
unnecessary in a better world, then it should not exist in the actual 
world.  When dire poverty, famine, slums, uncontrolled infectious 
diseases, civil war, child rape, and sex slavery no longer exist, 
perhaps we can refuse to allow biological parents to relinquish 
their children for international adoption.  At present, however, it 
cannot suffice to tell a child who is dying of starvation along with 
her AIDS-infected parents, and who has been raped several times 
while walking the five-mile road to the water spigot, that the state 
                                                     
146 Cf. David M. Smolin, Intercountry Adoption and Poverty: A Human Rights 
Analysis, 36 CAP. U. L. REV. 413, 434 (2007) (“Should hungry or malnourished birth 
parents, and their remaining children, be turned away with nothing, solely to 
protect the purity of their consents?”).  Smolin makes a strong case that when any 
birth parents in the most impoverished countries of the world propose to 
relinquish a child for adoption, they should be offered a sum of money sufficient 
to allow them to retain their children.  He suggests that this cost be passed onto 
adoption applicants and speculates that it might amount to an additional three 
thousand dollars or so per adoption.  He would still allow international adoption, 
but just require some greater effort to ensure poverty is not the only reason why 
parents give up their child.  See generally id.  The proposal is appealing and his 
reasoning forceful, but as explained above, there are normative and practical 
problems with imposing a tax on adopters, and if the money had to come from 
foreign government aid rather than from taxing adopters then the proposal would 
suffer from the Better World Fallacy. 
147 See, e.g., King, supra note 2, at 434; Yngvesson, supra note 19, at 213. 
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did not permit her parents to place her for international adoption 
at birth because it was worried about their autonomy.148 
The ‘child buying’ reason for foreclosing foreign adoption also 
suffers from the usual problem with prohibiting people from 
engaging in highly-desired transactions for fear of harmful side 
effects—namely, that it drives up the price where the transactions 
remain legal and it gives rise to an illegal market where the law 
prohibits them.  The concern about parental coercion should 
diminish the more open nations’ policies become with respect to 
international adoption, because the natural over-supply of truly 
orphaned children would eliminate any financial incentive to 
approach parents who are living and who are capable of raising 
their children.  Within a global framework, UNICEF’s successful 
pressuring of some nations to curtail international adoption must 
make ‘baby buying’ more common in other nations that are more 
receptive to international adoption, because it thereby becomes 
more lucrative.  Conversely, the most promising way to minimize 
coercion of parents might be to induce a change of policy in 
countries that have a great number of true orphans but currently 
prohibit international adoption.149  Dramatically increasing the 
number of true orphans available for international adoption should 
reduce the price agencies and countries charge adopters and 
eliminate or at least reduce the incentive for anyone to offer 
parents money for relinquishing a child for adoption.150 
In addition, generalizing the objection puts it in a much weaker 
light.  Undoubtedly, the vast majority of women creating profiles 
on international marriage websites are motivated by their poor 
economic circumstances in their country of origin rather than by 
simply a desire for adventure or special attraction to American 
men.  Would Russia be justified in prohibiting these Internet 
marriage brokers from operating in Russia or in refusing to permit 
its young women to emigrate for marriage purposes because of a 
                                                     
148 See Jonathan Todres, A Child Rights-Based Approach to Reconstruction in 
Haiti, 6 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 43, 67 (2010) (discussing dangers 
children face in the poorest regions of the world). 
149 Cf. Smolin, supra note 14, at 469-70 (noting that many potential sending 
countries are closed to foreign adoption, including nearly all of Africa); Wardle, 
supra note 44, at 116-17 (supplying data on the number of unparented children in 
developing countries). 
150 Cf. Smolin, supra note 14, at 492 (“[S]o long as adoption fees and donations 
are large enough to provide a substantial incentive for child laundering, the 
system will be vulnerable.”).  
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concern that they are motivated to forego relationships in Russia 
by the prospect of economic gain via international marriage?  The 
reality is that they will likely have much better lives in many ways 
by emigrating and living in a western country, despite the 
psychological and emotional costs of separating from their parents, 
other family members, and friends.  The legal system does not 
second-guess and override their decisions, even though the 
likelihood of a better life is probably not as great for adults through 
marriage as it is for children through adoption; the rate of domestic 
violence for ‘e-mail order brides’ is much higher than is the rate of 
maltreatment for international adoptees, and adjustment to a 
different culture, language, and way of life is undoubtedly more 
difficult for foreign brides than it is for internationally adopted 
infants.151  
In light of the extraordinarily high success rate for international 
adoptions,152 it appears that the real concern relating to money is 
not a child welfare concern, but rather a concern for the long-term 
happiness of biological parents in States of origin.  But that 
supposition about parental suffering has not been documented, 
overlooks the suffering parents experience when their children 
languish in orphanages or starve before their eyes, and in and of 
itself cannot justify denying a right to children.  Desperate parents 
themselves might be much better off in the long run by placing 
their child for adoption, as a result of knowing that their child is 
not suffering the same fate they have endured.  And if in the 
process they also receive some money that might allow them to 
feed their other children or themselves, it is not clear that 
something wrong has occurred.  Yes, it is horrible to think that any 
parents and children could be better off as a result of parents’ 
parting with their children.  But there are many places in the world 
where horrible is the human condition, and shutting down 
international adoption is not going to change that, just as 
prohibiting international marriage would not change it.  Adults are 
                                                     
151 See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 54, at 1653-54, 1660 (discussing international 
brides’ vulnerability to domestic violence); Kim, supra note 142, at 466–67, 474–75 
(examining legislation passed in response to incidences of domestic violence with 
mail order brides); Wechsler, supra note 138, at 4 (describing improvement in 
quality of life for children adopted internationally).  
152 See Stein et al., supra note 8, at 1431 (“For the vast majority of children who 
are adopted today, the prognosis is excellent.  In cases in which the 
developmental-behavioral outcome is problematic, diagnostic consideration 
should be given to factors that are not related to the adoption history.”). 
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entitled to make this difficult choice for themselves, based on their 
assessment of what is best for them, and children should have the 
analogous right of having someone make this choice on their 
behalf, based on what is in their best interests.153 
The most compelling reason states have for imposing 
restrictions on international adoption might be the possibility that 
parents have not actually consented to relinquish their children.  
There is evidence that parents are sometimes defrauded into 
turning over their children for adoption—for example, by false 
promises that they can continue to have contact with their children 
or would continue to benefit financially from the child’s 
adoption.154  In those cases, an inference about the children’s 
welfare based on the parents’ choice is less tenable.  This 
vulnerability to fraud does point to an additional problem with the 
children’s pre-adoption situation, though—that is, parents’ radical 
disempowerment, which must more generally diminish their 
ability to care for all their children.  Nevertheless, the HRC might 
accept as legitimate any restrictions on international adoption truly 
necessary to avoid defrauding of parents.  As noted above, the 
ICCPR lists protecting the rights of others among the permissible 
bases for restricting the right of emigration.  If the Committee 
accepted that birth parents have some possessory right to their 
children regardless of whether that is in the children’s best 
interests, then it might find some restrictive adoption policies 
warranted in some countries. 
However, pursuant to the Siracusa Principles, the burden 
would be on the country preventing children from emigrating to 
present persuasive evidence that this is a sufficiently frequent 
occurrence and that it cannot be stopped by other means.  The state 
would have to employ the least restrictive means to preventing 
children from being taken from parents without the parents’ free 
and informed consent.  A procedural fix should suffice; foreclosing 
foreign adoption altogether is grossly disproportionate.  Whereas 
within the special-rights framework of the CRC and Hague 
                                                     
153 See generally DWYER, supra note 95 (presenting a thorough theoretical 
analysis of children’s moral rights in connection with state decision making about 
their family relationships).  
154 See Blair, supra note 140, at 357–58 (“Parents were sometimes told that they 
could visit their child at an orphanage in Cambodia, or that a rich family would 
raise their child in the United States and send the family money and photographs, 
and that the child could petition for the parents’ immigration to the United States . 
. . .”). 
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Convention, a country can simply cite the DPP Principle and give 
no further justification for shutting down inter-country adoption, a 
challenge brought on behalf of children under the ICCPR would 
force that country to present substantial evidence of a problem and 
the necessity of a complete shutdown to address it.  The country 
would have to do this to overcome the strong presumption the 
ICCPR creates in favor of children’s having a right to leave the 
country to join a family and against the legitimacy of the state’s 
creating obstacles to this.  Notably, most countries that severely 
restrict or prohibit foreign adoptions, including Russia, have never 
claimed that this problem exists and underlies their policies. 
5.3. Child Welfare Concerns 
Certainly the ICCPR analysis must somehow uphold any 
restrictions on children’s right of emigration necessary to prevent 
adoptions that are not in their best interests, all things considered.  
I am by no means suggesting in this Article that inter-country 
adoption is the best option for every unparented child in poor 
countries.  The HRC might sensibly read “best interests of non-
autonomous right holders” into the public health exception, or it 
might permit a state to rebut representatives’ prima facie case for 
asserting children’s right to emigrate by demonstrating that their 
position is actually contrary to the children’s welfare, on the whole 
and all things considered.  It would be nonsensical to allow proxy 
assertion of a right on behalf of children to produce a result that is 
actually worse for them than an available alternative.  General 
rights also present the danger of harming non-autonomous 
holders. 
Particular aspects of children’s wellbeing that receive attention 
include both red herrings and legitimate concerns.  Even the 
legitimate concerns, however, are far from sufficient to justify 
categorically denying children without families the opportunity for 
international adoption.  The reality is that international adoptees 
on the whole do very well, despite the special issues that arise for 
them.  The exceptions are mostly children who incurred substantial 
developmental damage from their early experience in their country 
of birth, in which case they would almost certainly have fared even 
worse by remaining in their country of origin, where there are 
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unlikely to be special services and medical care for special-needs 
children.155 
5.3.1. Providing Children for Parents Rather Than Parents for 
Children 
One of the oddest complaints about international adoption is 
that it has transformed from a practice done for charitable reasons, 
in reaction to the publicized plight of children orphaned by World 
War II, the Vietnam War, and the Korean War, to a practice serving 
the desires of adults in affluent nations who want to have children 
but are unable to procreate.156  This simple story might reflect 
reality to some degree, but it is hardly a complete or entirely 
accurate account of adopting parents’ motivations.157  It omits, for 
example, mention of the thousands of Americans who by choice 
adopt special-needs children and the thousands who adopt even 
though they already have biological offspring and could produce 
more if they wished.158 
The larger problem with this complaint, however, is the 
unexamined premise that it is worse in some way for people to 
adopt children when they truly desire a relationship with the 
children rather than solely because they feel sorry for the children.  
No one has argued explicitly that the supposedly self-interested 
motivation of modern-day adopters is itself sufficient reason to 
stop international adoption, but the purpose of alleging it is clearly 
to add to the reasons for viewing international adoption in a 
negative light.159  Yet if we place international adoption into the 
                                                     
155 See, e.g., HOWELL, supra note 18, at 103–07 (showing that the vast majority 
of adopted children develop well); Triseliotis, supra note 125, at 124–27, 131. 
156 See, e.g., Smolin, supra note 72, at 242–43; Yngvesson, supra note 19, at 216; 
Bergquist, supra note 126, at 350 (alleging “a shift from a child-centered to parent-
centered focus in adoption”). 
157 But see King, supra note 2, at 419–25 (telling a more complex historical 
story). 
158 See generally Herszenhorn, supra note 13.  See also Wardle, supra note 44, at 
115 (“[F]ew international transactions . . . compare with the selfless, charitable, 
and compassionate act of responsible adults taking stranger children from foreign 
countries and cultures into their homes, as members of their own families, and 
assuming the obligation to feed, clothe, house, teach, love, nurture and protect the 
children . . . .”). 
159 See, e.g., Selman, supra note 141, at 258, 260 (insinuating that gratifying 
childless couples has become the dominant motivation for international adoption, 
at the expense of children’s welfare); Triseliotis, supra note 125, at 119 (“[A] 
healthy motive is generally seen to be one that aims to provide a home for a needy 
child rather than a child for a home.”). 
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larger context of emigration for purpose of family formation, and 
we ask what justifications might suffice for infringing anyone’s 
right to leave their country of origin for that purpose, it 
immediately becomes apparent how ironic is this charge.  No 
doubt, if one surveyed women who have come to the United States 
for marriage to American men and asked, “Would you rather that 
your husband married you because he really wanted a wife and 
fell in love with you, or instead because he felt sorry for you?” the 
uniform answer would be the former.  A similar survey of adopted 
children would undoubtedly produce a similar result—that is, they 
would rather have been adopted because their parents really 
wanted to have a parent-child relationship rather than because 
their parents pitied them.  The former motivation is more likely to 
coincide with parents’ having a very positive view of the child, as a 
blessing rather than a burden, and any child should prefer that.  
Adoption proponents can turn this story on its head, arguing that 
it is wonderful that the modern adopter truly wants a relationship 
with the child and is more likely than the adopters of old to make 
the child feel special and valued. 
5.3.2. Trafficking 
A clearly legitimate reason for imposing institutional 
requirements and procedural and substantive restrictions on 
adoption, whether domestic or international, would be the danger 
that people aiming to exploit children sexually or by slave labor 
might attempt to acquire victims through adoption, rather than, for 
example, kidnapping.  Consistent with common usage in 
international human rights documents and U.S. Department of 
State publications, I use ‘trafficking’ to mean acquisition of 
children for exploitation.160  I treated separately above the topic of 
parents being induced by payments and/or fraud to relinquish 
their children for adoption, which some authors, for rhetorical 
purpose, confusingly conflate with trafficking.161 
                                                     
160 See, e.g., Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children, G.A. Res. 55/25, art. 3(a), U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/55/25 (Nov. 15, 2000) (“’Trafficking in persons’ shall mean the 
recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons . . . for the 
purpose of exploitation”); see generally U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 
REPORT 2012 (2012), available at http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2012/. 
161 See generally David M. Smolin, Intercountry Adoption as Child Trafficking, 39 
VAL. U. L. REV. 281 (2004). 
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Trafficking in the exploitative sense is a large and deeply 
troubling practice.162  But this concern is a red herring in the 
adoption context, ironic even.  Traffickers are exceedingly unlikely 
to use official adoption channels as the means for securing children 
for sex trade or slave labor, so imposing legal restrictions on 
official adoption will not diminish trafficking.  In fact, there is no 
evidence of a significant connection between trafficking and 
international adoption.  One might suppose that a westerner who 
is a child sex predator could conclude that a promising strategy for 
obtaining access to a child’s body is to go to a third world country 
and pose as an adoption applicant.  But there is no evidence of this 
occurring, and it seems quite unlikely to succeed, given the natural 
suspicion, or in many countries legal preclusion, of adoption 
petitions filed by single men,163 and given the need to navigate the 
immigration process for bringing a child into a western country. 
Moreover, this supposed justification for making international 
adoption more difficult or impossible is actually ironic because the 
more a country creates obstacles to parents’ placing their children 
with official adoption agencies the more likely desperate parents 
are to give their children (perhaps unwittingly) to traffickers.  A 
father who concludes that he is unable to care for his child after the 
mother has died and who finds that no family or community 
member is available to foster the child would presumably prefer to 
place the child for adoption into a good family.  However, if his 
country makes that impossible through approved agencies or 
intermediaries, the child will be at great risk of starvation, 
kidnapping, or being sold off to anyone who approaches the 
parent with a stack of currency and empty promises. 
The foregoing points can be made within the special rights 
framework.  What appeal to general rights adds is a requirement 
that any asserted justification apply equally in the case of adults.  
Trafficking is obviously a concern with adults as well, especially 
women, and actually much more common with adolescent girls 
and women than with little children.  That very concern, coupled 
with a suspicion that some women are lured into slavery by the 
prospect of marrying a westerner, ostensibly led the Philippines to 
                                                     
162 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 160, at 45.  
163 See Jennifer B. Mertus, Barriers, Hurdles, and Discrimination: The Current 
Status of LGBT Intercountry Adoption and Why Changes Must Be Made to Effectuate 
the Best Interests of the Child, 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 271, 281–83 (2011) (stating that 
many sending countries’ laws prohibit single parents from adopting). 
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prohibit the operation of for-profit international marriage brokers 
in that country.164  That action might suggest some support for the 
notion of restricting emigration even of adults for paternalistic 
reasons.  However, the Philippines is alone in having such a 
prohibition.  Guatemala, which shut down international adoption 
because of some reports of illicit payments and defrauding of 
parents in connection with true adoptions (i.e., not trafficking), is a 
major source of sex trafficking of women.165  Yet neither the 
Guatemalan nor American government has proposed as a remedy 
a prohibition on emigration of women from Guatemala; the 
response to this much more harmful practice toward adolescents 
and adults is instead to attempt to detect the illegal practice and 
prosecute wrongdoers.  The Philippine law, moreover, is little 
enforced, is limited to restricting activities of certain businesses, 
and in no way inhibits the emigration of Filipinas who find foreign 
marriage partners by one of the innumerable other available 
means.166 
If the Philippine law did substantially diminish women’s 
freedom to leave the country to pursue a better life, the human 
rights community would likely condemn the law.  It would do so 
not just because there is consensus that women in desperate 
poverty must be free, as autonomous adults, to accept the risk that 
what looks like a real marriage prospect could turn out to be 
enslavement, even if it is irrational to do so.  It would be so in large 
part because that risk of being trafficked is actually not high 
enough to make the decision to pursue international marriage 
irrational.  In addition, under the ICCPR and the Siracusa 
                                                     
164 See Roxanne Sims, A Comparison of Laws in the Phillipines [sic], the U.S.A., 
Taiwan, and Belarus to Regulate the Mail-Order Bride Industry, 42 AKRON L. REV. 607, 
616–17 (2009) (“The Philippines legislature intended for Republic Act No. 6955 to 
protect Filipino women from being sexually and economically exploited by 
international marriage brokers.”).  The law might well have been a self-interested 
reaction by male legislators to the exodus of women from the country to marry 
Western men. 
165 See generally Hannah Stone, Guatemala Creates Investigative Body to Fight 
Human Trafficking, IN SIGHT CRIME (July 20, 2012), http://www.insightcrime.org/ 
news-briefs/guatemala-creates-investigative-body-to-fight-human-trafficking. 
166 See Lilith, supra note 126, at 227 (“In spite of changes in Philippine law 
intending to curb mail-order brides by banning organizations and advertisements 
which promote marriages between Filipinas and foreign nationals, the number of 
Filipina mail-order brides brought to U.S. increased steadily throughout the 
1990s.”); id. at 255 (quoting a Filipina woman: “’There is nothing that can be done 
to stop us from giving our names to pen pal companies’”); Sims, supra note 164, at 
616–18 (describing limited effect of the Philippine law ). 
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Principles, the state of origin would bear the burden of showing 
that prohibiting emigration is the least restrictive means of 
protecting women from exploitation.  Prevailing rules and practice 
suggest that concern about trafficking is generally viewed as 
insufficient reason to deny any adults, even vulnerable ones, the 
right to emigrate, which in turn creates a presumption under the 
ICCPR that it is insufficient reason to deny children that right. 
I will also note that, even if there were a substantial connection 
between trafficking of children for sex or labor and official 
adoption channels, the problem cannot logically justify particular 
types of restrictions that many countries have adopted.  In 
particular, it does not justify any application of the DPP 
Principle—not a policy of prohibiting international adoption but 
allowing domestic adoption, not a policy of preferring domestic 
adoption or foster care to international adoption, and not a policy 
of holding children in orphanages for years to ensure domestic 
adoption possibilities are exhausted before making them available 
to foreigners.  If there are sex predators who pose as adoption 
applicants, they are more likely to be residents of the third world 
country, and they are likely to prefer older children rather than 
babies.167  Moreover, larger organizations in the business of 
supplying children for sex tourism or factory labor, whether they 
are in the sending country or not, could undoubtedly easily hire 
locals to pose as adoption or foster care applicants, if they thought 
that were a more propitious way of getting children than going 
directly to impoverished parents. 
5.3.3. Mistreatment of Children in Receiving Countries 
Russian politicians have frequently cited as justification for 
restricting foreign adoptions incidents of serious harm or death to 
children adopted from Russia.  Proponents of international 
adoption argue that it is irrational to condemn a practice involving 
tens of thousands of children annually on the grounds that a very 
                                                     
167 Cf. Jim Loney, Haiti “Restavek” Tradition Called Child Slavery, REUTERS (Feb. 
18, 2010 9:17 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/02/18/us-quake-haiti-
restaveks-idUSTRE61H3F920100218 (reporting that the prevalent form of “foster 
care” in Haiti functions as child slavery). 
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small number of cases have gone badly.168  Critics respond that 
problems are more common than proponents think.169  
What critics have not done, though, is an evidence-based 
comparison of probabilities of maltreatment under the alternative 
placements that were available for the children who were adopted.  
To respond to reports of maltreatment, or simply to reports of 
adjustment difficulties, by foreclosing international adoption is 
nonsensical and irresponsible if that is still the available option 
with the best odds of a good life for children.  What critics would 
need to show is that the very process of transferring a child from 
an orphanage to an adoptive placement in another country itself is 
more likely to damage the child than is some alternative, including 
remaining in the orphanage until adulthood, transferring to an 
adoptive or foster placement in the country of birth, being put out 
on the streets, and so on.  Absent such demonstration, the strong 
presumption in favor of the right to emigrate under the ICCPR 
controls. 
And, in fact, available evidence shows that the complete 
opposite is the reality, that the rates of maltreatment and harm are 
far greater in poor countries’ non-parent-care systems than in 
adoptive homes in other countries.170  Especially in light of those 
comparative figures, the intuition of most people would 
undoubtedly be that taking a chance on becoming part of a family 
is a better choice than remaining in any institution or mercenary 
foster home, that joining a family in another country soon after 
                                                     
168 See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet, International Adoption: A Way Forward, 55 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 687, 697 (2010/11). 
169 See, e.g., Smolin, supra note 14, at 474. 
170 See, e.g., Christopher Balding, International Child Adoption Law and 
Empirical Analysis (forthcoming) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania 
Journal of International Law) (showing increased health and development risks 
for orphaned children not adopted); Christopher Balding, Feng Yan, & Armita 
Atashband, Who Wants to Adopt and Who Wants to Be Adopted: A Sample of American 
Families and Sub-Saharan African Orphans, (forthcoming) (on file with the 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law) (contrasting the benefits 
of adoptive families with increased levels of material deprivation in sub-Saharan 
African orphans); Myra Imran, Condition of Child Rights Remained Bleak During 
2012, THE NEWS (Pak.), May 29, 2013, http://www.thenews.com.pk/ 
PrintEdition.aspx?ID=180510&Cat=6&dt=9/7/2013 (describing dire situations 
that Pakistani children face, including “lack of educational opportunities, poor 
health conditions, a near absence of protection for poor and vulnerable children, 
miserable conditions in juvenile jails and continued employment of children in 
hazardous occupations[, as well as] physical violence, sexual abuse, trafficking, 
recruitment in armed conflict and acid attacks”). 
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birth is preferable to waiting a couple of years in institutional care 
to see if any local family will step forward, and that joining a 
family in the United States or Sweden is even preferable to 
immediately joining a family in the country of one’s birth if the 
latter family is living in deep poverty or in a place that has no 
prospects for education and employment or is surrounded by 
violence. 
Placing international adoption within the broader framework 
of transnational family formation suggests another comparison.  
We should ask how the rate of abuse toward adopted children 
compares to the rate of abuse by husbands against immigrant 
wives.  Further, we should ask why no one proposes as the remedy 
for the perceived high rate of domestic violence toward immigrant 
brides that the sending countries simply prohibit the emigration of 
women for marriage or that the receiving countries deny them an 
entry visa.  Instead, the law’s response is simply to elicit more 
information from the persons in receiving countries seeking to 
form a family relationship with a vulnerable person from a poor 
country through an intermediary—namely, requiring self-
reporting and/or agency-conducted background checks, as is 
already done with adoption.171  Within a framework of rights 
shared by all persons, the potential for domestic abuse is placed in 
a more objective light.  And the ICCPR requirement of non-
discrimination presumptively precludes reliance on this concern as 
justification for restricting children’s right to leave their country of 
origin, if the same concern, with even stronger empirical 
foundation, would not justify restricting adults’ right of 
emigration. 
5.3.4. Cultural Interests of Children 
Another common objection to international adoption rests on 
children’s supposed interest in remaining within the culture of 
their state of origin or partaking in their “cultural heritage.”172  
                                                     
171 See Abrams, supra note 54, at 1653–64 (discussing International Marriage 
Broker Regulation Act of 2005, 8 U.S.C. § 1375a (2012)). 
172 See, e.g., Smolin, supra note 72, at 242 (“Stripping a child of her identity 
and familial, community, and cultural heritage is a severe deprivation of rights, as 
the child generally has no choice in the matter and has her fundamental 
orientation to herself and the world altered without her consent.”); King, supra 
note 2, at 414, 466 (noting that in some countries intercountry adoptions are not 
permitted); Roby & Shaw, supra note 145, at 202–05 (emphasizing “the importance 
of racial and cultural identity for children in their adoption experience”). 
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Many claim this is the primary concern underwriting the DPP 
Principle.173  International adoption proponents point out the 
suspect metaphysical nature of such a claim, at least as applied to 
very young children, who are the most likely to be adopted.  It 
seems to suppose that even if a child born in, for example, Korea is 
adopted and brought to the United States at the age of one, and 
spends the rest of his life living in the United States, that “his 
culture” is Korean culture.174  Such essentializing is normatively 
problematic and empirically suspect.  An infant has little or no 
experience of culture, and to suppose that any child is per se 
harmed by moving away from his or her place of birth would 
damn every parent who has ever relocated from one country to 
another, or even from one sub-national region or province to 
another. 
Elizabeth Bartholet refers to this cultural identity objection to 
international adoption as “the false romanticism surrounding birth 
and national heritage”175 and notes:  “[s]cience provides no basis 
for believing that children are better off if raised in their 
community of origin.”176  In fact, studies involving interviews of 
international adoptees, which presumably are the best evidence of 
their experience, reveal that the vast majority feel little sense of loss 
and little desire to learn more about or visit their country of 
birth.177  It also appears that citizens of sending countries 
                                                     
173 See, e.g., Hearst, note 1, at 335–36 (arguing that children should have the 
right to access their culture of origin); Smolin, supra note 146, at 422 (“Under 
international law, adoption within the child’s birth country is clearly preferred 
over intercountry adoption. The basis of this preference is apparently related to 
the child’s identity rights.”) (footnote omitted).  
174 See, e.g., Hearst, supra note 1, at 334. 
175 Elizabeth Bartholet, Permanency Is Not Enough: Children Need the Nurturing 
Parents Found in International Adoption, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 781, 785 (2011). 
176 Bartholet, supra note 5, at 97 (citation omitted). 
177 See, e.g., HOWELL, supra note 18, at 80, 111-21 (finding, based on interviews 
with adoptees returning to Norway from “motherland tours,” that most come 
back “fully confirmed in their Norwegianness”).  Transracial adoptions raise a 
somewhat different concern about “fitting in” one’s adoptive family.  That has 
been an issue in debates over adoption domestically within the United States.  The 
concern arises in the United States mostly for black children raised by white 
adoptive parents.  See Bergquist, supra note 126, at 348.  This occurs only for a 
small percentage of international adoptive children.  And though it is a genuine 
issue, a potential source of difficulty for adopted children, studies show that it is 
not so substantial a difficulty as to justify significant impediments to transracial 
adoptions.  See id.  (“Early adoption research documented the successful 
adaptation of minority children into their white middle class families, and more 
recent studies have indicated that these children do well in school, attach to their 
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themselves do not think people born there lose anything significant 
by separating from the country at an early age and being raised in 
a different culture; many express puzzlement with westerners’ 
preoccupation with “roots.”178 
Increasingly, international adopters have been encouraged to 
facilitate their children’s learning about their nation of origin and 
forming a positive impression of it, and that has become common 
practice.179  Some do not, and those who do cannot give a child an 
insider’s experience of the native country’s culture.180  But even so, 
there is little empirical support for the supposition that 
internationally adopted children commonly feel a great sense of 
loss if they do not have a strong connection to their native culture.  
Nor is there any factual basis for supposing that, for any children 
who do experience such a sense of loss, this is such a detriment to 
their wellbeing as to outweigh the improvements to their lives 
arising from the adoption.181  It certainly would not mean that their 
lives are devoid of any culture.  Sara Dillon aptly states: 
In order to be consistent with the international rights of 
children, legal regimes must reflect a hierarchy of human 
needs, with consistency and depth of care placed at the top 
                                                     
adoptive families, and have relatively few psychosocial or behavioral problems in 
comparison to their white peers.”) (footnotes omitted); Tanya M. Washington, 
Throwing Black Babies Out With the Bathwater: A Child-Centered Challenge to Same-
Sex Adoption Bans, 6 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L. J. 1, 47–49 (2008–2009) 
(discussing Congressional finding that not being adopted is more harmful than 
any difficulty transracial placement might entail).  
178 See, e.g., HOWELL, supra note 18, at 209 (Ethiopia); id. at 215 (China); id. at 
220 (Romania). 
179 See HOWELL, supra note 2, at 238 (showing that adoptive parents often take 
children on “roots” or “motherland tours”); HOWELL, supra note 18, at 32, 76–79 
(describing pamphlets, associations among families, organized trips back to 
country of origin, etc.); Stark, supra note 131, at 1270–71 (discussing the tendency 
of white parents to make Chinese culture a part of their adopted Chinese 
children’s lives).  But see HOWELL, supra note 18, at 74 (providing evidence that 
many Norwegian adoptive parents attempt to distance the child from the native 
culture, at least initially, in an effort to ensure the child’s full assimilation to a new 
home). 
180 See Hearst, supra note 1, at 339 (explaining that it is difficult for adopted 
children to be exposed to their origin country in any meaningful way). 
181 Cf. HOWELL, supra note 18, at 78–79 (noting the view of some observers 
that efforts to give children a community and cultural experience tied to their 
adoption from another country might serve interests of adoptive parents more 
than interests of the children); id. at 106 (describing adoptees who categorically 
reject the notion that they are incomplete unless they connect with the culture of 
their country of birth). 
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of the hierarchy.  National legal regimes should not be 
constructed on the belief that complex relationships with 
cultural environments are the equivalent of the 
psychological problems that arise from long-term residence 
in institutional or other inadequate care.182 
Elizabeth Bartholet draws a similar analogy to adult emigration 
of the sort I have made throughout this Article, to put in proper 
perspective the concern about culture.  She points out that “it 
would be laughable to argue that adults should be prevented from 
leaving their country of birth so they could enjoy their heritage 
rights.”183  Invoking the more general human right to emigrate 
under the UDHR and the ICCPR gives that analogy legal purchase, 
insofar as those legal documents create a strong presumption that 
all persons possess the same rights, and so that any justification 
that would be inadequate in the case of adults must also be so in 
the case of children. 
Further, thinking about cultural ties within this broader context 
gives us a clearer and more objective sense of its relative 
importance as an empirical matter, for then we can look to the 
decisions autonomous adults make as evidence of how they 
prioritize their various interests.  Adults who have spent their 
entire lives thus far in their native land naturally are more wedded 
to the culture of that land than is an infant and have more of their 
identity bound up with it.  Yet a large portion of them have 
decided that they nevertheless want to emigrate to a more 
advanced nation because the opportunities for a better life, 
including a better family life, are so much greater there that they 
outweigh any interest in remaining immersed in their native 
culture, language, and family life.  In addition, pregnant foreign 
women by the thousands travel to the United States each year in 
the hope of giving birth here and thereby securing U.S. citizenship 
for their children, so that the children can upon reaching 
adulthood (or sooner) leave their native land and families and 
come to live in the United States.184  These phenomena ought to tell 
                                                     
182 Sara Dillon, Making Legal Regimes for Intercountry Adoption Reflect Human 
Rights Principles: Transforming the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child with the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption, 21 B.U. INT’L L.J. 179, 238 
(2003) (footnote omitted). 
183 Bartholet, supra note 5, at 97.  
184 See Cindy Chang, In Suburbs of L.A., a Cottage Industry of Birth Tourism, 
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/print/2013/jan/03/local/la-
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us something about the relative importance of cultural heritage to 
human welfare.  The cost-benefit analysis presumably tips even 
more so in favor of migration for infants, both because they have 
less to give up culturally and because they can more easily adapt to 
a new culture, language, and living situation. 
Moreover, there would also be no purchase to moral 
exhortation directed at adults aiming to emigrate via marriage that 
they should prefer a domestic marriage, and so should not move to 
another country and form a family with someone there so long as 
there is any “suitable” spouse available to them in their home 
country.  Many women in former Soviet Union countries who seek 
husbands in Western countries explain their choice largely in terms 
of having a low opinion of Russian men and perceiving little 
prospect for the kind of marriage they want in their native 
country.185  This view might be even more compelling if held by 
women in any Islamic countries where norms relating to family life 
are more intensely patriarchal.  We would never suggest to these 
women that they ought, in order to avoid losing touch with their 
native culture or in order to fulfill some obligation to their native 
country, to settle for a merely suitable spouse at home rather than 
aiming higher by seeking a spouse abroad. 
This leads to a further problem with the objection based on 
cultural heritage.  If we were to survey adults seeking to leave the 
countries that are traditional or potential sending countries for 
adoption, and ask them what they think of life and culture in their 
home country, undoubtedly a great many of them, especially 
women, would portray their native culture negatively.186  We 
might reasonably assume there is some good in every national 
culture, but consider just the idea of America returning to its 
culture of two centuries ago and how unappealing that would be 
to the women of America today.  Opponents of international 
                                                     
me-birthing-centers-20130104 (describing L.A.’s growing number of “maternity 
hotels,” where foreign women stay for the sole purpose of giving birth in the 
United States). 
185 See Christine S.Y. Chun, Comment, The Mail-Order Bride Industry: The 
Perpetuation of Transnational Economic Inequalities and Stereotypes, 17 U. PA. INT’L 
ECON. L. 1155, 1175 (1996) (reporting view of many Russian women that American 
men will make better husbands than Russian men). 
186 Cf. Stark, supra note 131, at 1272–73 (noting that Americans who adopt 
Chinese girls and who endeavor to give their daughters a connection to Chinese 
culture tend to omit “the misogyny of traditional Chinese culture” and 
“Confucian ideas about family hierarchy and patriarchy”). 
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adoption who invoke children’s supposed cultural interests are 
astonishingly silent about the possibility that a particular country’s 
culture might actually have deeply troubling aspects to it.  It is as 
if, for some critics of international adoption, the only country in the 
world whose culture is subject to criticism is the United States.  
That of every other country is unassailable, and only an arrogant 
imperialist would suggest that some cultures are best left behind.  
Meanwhile, in another part of the academy and in another realm of 
international human rights advocacy, Westerners are freely 
condemning many of these same countries for systematically 
violating their citizens’ human rights in ways that make life 
generally intolerable for many people—for example, by promoting 
subordination of women, by condoning violence toward women 
and sexual minorities, by mutilating girls’ genitals, by forcing ten-
year old girls to marry old men and forcing ten year-old boys to 
fight in wars, by killing adherents to minority religions, by jailing 
political dissenters, and so on.187  All that critics of international 
adoption see in the cultures of poor countries, it seems, is folk tales, 
ceremonial dances, and colorful costumes.  Sui generis thinking 
about children facilitates such myopic and surrealist romanticizing 
of life in the third world. 
5.3.5. Kinship Ties 
Some critics of international adoption maintain that 
international adoption entails a great loss for children insofar as it 
separates them from their biological kin and that sending countries 
should pursue the possibility of kin care for every child in an 
orphanage before approving an adoption by a foreigner.  They 
would give kin placement categorical preference over international 
adoption with non-kin.188 
It is plausible to suppose that, all else being equal, children are 
better off being raised by extended family members when parents 
are unable to care for them.  This position that international 
adoption should be put off for a child while agencies search for kin 
to take the child is problematic, however, for several reasons.  One 
                                                     
187 See, e.g., Blaine Bookey, Enforcing the Right to be Free from Sexual Violence 
and the Role of Lawyers in Post-Earthquake Haiti, 14 CUNY L. REV. 255, 259–63 (2011) 
(stating that sexual violence is common in Haiti); Todres, supra note 148, at 60–61 
(offering evidence that children in Haiti experience a variety of human rights 
violations). 
188 See, e.g., Smolin, supra note 72, at 240–241; King, supra note 2, at 466. 
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downside is delay.  Children need attachment figures in place as 
early as possible for their healthy development, so the longer they 
live in an institutional setting, the more they suffer 
developmentally.189  A foreign adoption also takes substantial time, 
but there is nearly complete certainty that at the end of the process 
permanency will have been achieved, whereas a domestic search is 
quite likely to end in failure. 
Elizabeth Bartholet has proposed as a solution to the delay 
problem associated with seeking kin or other domestic placements 
that countries engage in a form of “concurrent planning,” and she 
co-authored federal legislation that commits the United States to 
promoting this practice.190  Sending countries would search for a 
good domestic placement but at the same time complete as many 
steps as possible toward a foreign adoption, so that if a good 
domestic placement does not arise, the foreign adoption can go 
forward immediately.  This approach might sound more costly for 
sending countries, but it is not necessarily so.  If we assume that 
searches for domestic adopters or kin guardians usually fail, then 
the alternative to conducting both processes for each child 
concurrently is usually to do them both anyway but sequentially.  
Bartholet’s concurrent planning proposal might actually lower 
countries’ costs on the whole, because the sequential approach 
causes children to remain longer in state care before being 
available for foreign adoption, and that means both that the state 
must support most children for a longer period of time, and that 
some children who could have been adopted ultimately are not 
because they become too old while held in institutional limbo. 
An additional problem with emphasis on kin placement is that 
nonparent kin can be as exploitative as child-labor traffickers, 
taking in a child not out of loving concern for the child’s wellbeing 
but rather out of mercenary motivation (e.g., if they will receive 
payments to do so) and/or desire for free labor.  The so-called 
                                                     
189 See Dwyer, supra note 8, at 415–35. 
190 Children in Families First Act of 2013, S. 1530, 113th Cong. (2013); 
Bartholet, supra note 35, at 193–94.  In the domestic child protection context, 
“concurrent planning” has a different meaning, referring to simultaneously 
attempting rehabilitation of parents and preparing for a termination of parental 
rights and adoption should the rehabilitation efforts fail.  
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“foster-care system” in Haiti, for example, is known for turning 
orphans into relatives’ indentured servants.191 
Further, connection to kin is, as a factual matter, even when a 
positive thing, only one variable in a child’s overall wellbeing, and 
in many cases its possibility is outweighed by the quality of care 
particular kin are capable of providing (e.g., if they are living in 
abject poverty) and problems in the community or nation where 
the kin live (e.g., famine, war, disease, oppression).  In fact, some 
studies of international adoptees suggest ties to biological family 
are much less important to them than DPP Principle supporters 
assert.192  They show that international adoptees who as 
adolescents return to their country of birth, typically at the urging 
of their adoptive parents, do not manifest great interest in tracking 
down birth parents or biological relatives.193  Moreover, even 
assuming this is an important experience or desire for them, there 
is no evidence that any conclude they would have been better off 
remaining in their country of birth and being raised among their 
biological kin.  Adoptees become integrated into a kin network 
with their adoptive family, and that network of relationships is 
constitutive of their identity.194  At most, international adoptees 
might want at some point to know about their biological relatives 
and to make contact with them, and if they fail in their search they 
do not conclude that they were harmed by being adopted. 
In any event, I have assumed in this article that the children in 
question are generally ones whose parents are deceased or have 
lost or relinquished custody and whose biological kin are not 
available to care for them—in other words, children whose only 
alternatives to international adoption even in theory are just 
domestic adoption or foster care by strangers and institutional 
placement.  As to these children, whereas any of these alternatives 
might allow a child to grow up in a native culture, none inherently 
involve maintaining ties to extended biological family.  Many 
cultures within developing countries have a tradition of communal 
care for children and child rearing by kin or biologically unrelated 
                                                     
191 See Carlson, supra note 15, at 762 (“In Haiti, what might pass for foster care 
is actually a form of indentured servitude.”); Loney, supra note 167 (describing 
Haitian tradition of “restavek” as child slavery). 
192 See HOWELL, supra note 18, at 111–21 (offering evidence that many adopted 
children are not concerned by biological ties to family). 
193 Id. at 114. 
194 See, e.g., Howell, supra note 2, at 232–33; HOWELL, supra note 18 at 74. 
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community members, but poverty, disease, war, and other 
tragedies have made it impossible for many communities to 
sustain this tradition.195  This insistence that a government agency 
pursue kin seems to presuppose that no one else has done so 
before the child ends up in an orphanage.  Yet it seems more 
plausible to assume that any parents who bring their child to an 
orphanage have first exhausted other possibilities and that when 
parents have died, relatives were aware of this but concluded that 
they were unable to assume custody of the child. 
5.3.6 Summary 
None of the objections commonly leveled at international 
adoption suffice to deny the children of any country the right to 
leave for purposes of family formation.  Concern about parents 
being defrauded might be pertinent under the ICCPR, but a 
country would have to document it and address it by the least 
restrictive means.  Any other concerns that do not relate to the 
welfare of children awaiting adoption are impertinent.  As to child 
welfare concerns, the only experiences that are clearly bad are 
trafficking or maltreatment by adoptive parents.  As to those, 
sending countries bear the burden under the ICCPR of 
demonstrating that the problem is sufficiently pervasive to warrant 
some policy response and the burden of limiting that response to 
measures that constitute the least restrictive means of addressing 
those problems.  Significantly, these child welfare concerns do not 
justify a rule prioritizing domestic placement of unparented 
children; such a rule will not inhibit trafficking in the exploitative 
sense and children currently in orphanages or living on streets are 
much more likely to incur harm if they remain in their native 
country.  To give effect to children’s right of emigration, as with 
any other right they possess, entails a proxy decision on their 
behalf as to how to best serve their interests taking all relevant 
factors into consideration.  Critics of international adoption have 
not demonstrated that international adoption is with any 
frequency an irrational proxy decision for children. 
                                                     
195 See, e.g., Roby & Shaw, supra note 145, at 200; Celia W. Dugger, Aid Gives 
Alternative to African Orphanages, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2009, http://www.nytimes. 
com/2009/12/06/world/africa/06orphans.html (reporting that “children placed 
in institutions are often seen as the lucky ones” because families are often too poor 
to provide education or adequate food.). 
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With respect to several concerns, I have noted that they might 
be more significant in the case of older children.  Compared to 
newborns and infants, older children are more likely to have 
psychological problems at the outset that could trigger 
maltreatment by adoptive parents and that could otherwise make 
the transition to a new situation difficult.  They are also more likely 
to have a worldview and personal identity tied to their native 
country’s culture and more likely to suffer in the short term from 
changing linguistic environment.  Further, they are more likely to 
know their biological extended family and to have established 
relationships with siblings.  These differences could in theory 
support different policies for older children relative to the 
youngest, perhaps entailing more effort to secure a domestic 
placement for older children.196  Yet some common current state 
policies actually embody an opposite policy stance, such as those 
permitting only domestic adoptions for children until they reach a 
certain age.  Were UNICEF and the Children’s Rights Committee 
truly concerned only about the wellbeing of children, they might 
pressure sending nations to favor expedited international adoption 
of babies and to favor domestic placement of some kind—when one 
is available—just with older children.  Unfortunately for older 
children, the prospects for a domestic placement are also much 
worse than they are for infants, so limiting their options by 
imposing a stronger domestic placement preference, one that 
delays or forestalls adoption, is likely to be on balance harmful to 
them as well.  For no child should such a preference result in 
remaining in institutional or foster care for a substantial period 
when a good adoptive placement is available. 
6. CONCLUSION 
It is time to start a new conversation about international 
adoption, putting aside the special children focused conventions 
and beginning instead with general human rights that children 
share with adults—most promisingly, the “right to leave any 
country.”  This would establish a presumption that children should 
receive treatment comparable to that given adults in similar 
circumstances.  And it would place squarely on countries where 
                                                     
196 Cf. Smolin, supra note 146, at 424 (“[I]n some instances, high quality foster 
care or institutional care might be superior to the extreme language, cultural, and 
educational transitions that intercountry adoption would require of school age 
children.”) (footnote omitted). 
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unparented children live the burden of justifying any obstacles 
they have created to children’s emigration for purposes of family 
formation. 
The cautionary lesson here about group-specific rights extends 
more broadly.  Advocates for children and other vulnerable groups 
should guard against getting lost in the thicket of specialized 
conventions, constitutional amendments, or statutes.  In fact, they 
should resist the lure of enacting special-rights laws in the first 
place; such enactments might initially represent a gain in some 
ways relative to the status quo, but they might represent a loss in 
other ways and might freeze the group in a subordinate position as 
the rights of others advance.  Advocates should return repeatedly 
to universal rights instruments to mine them for support and 
potentially more effective procedures to redress human rights 
violations.  
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